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I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following scenario: you are an employee who has spent the 
last decade feverishly working for a single company.  You spend each workday 
frustratingly earning an hourly wage but nonetheless endure the experience as 
it is the best opportunity to support your family.  In order to meet your familial 
demands, you are limited to working approximately twenty to twenty-five hours 
per week.  Suddenly, your spouse, who has long battled the ups and downs of 
cancer, makes a turn for the worse.  In order to care for your suffering spouse, 
you inquire with your employer about taking unpaid medical leave under the 
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Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA or Act).1  You know that certain 
requirements must be met in order to be eligible for FMLA leave,2 one of which 
is having worked at least 1,250 hours in the last year, dating back from the day 
you requested leave.3  Fearing that you might not meet the requisite hours of 
service because you worked closer to twenty hours per week in the past year 
rather than twenty-five, you are relieved to learn from your employer by formal 
letter that you qualify for FMLA leave.  Thus, you begin taking your twelve 
weeks of FMLA leave, the maximum time allotted under the Act.4  
During your fourth week of FMLA leave, your employer sends you a 
second letter stating that a miscalculation of your previous year’s hours of 
service occurred, and you were actually ineligible for FMLA leave.  Because 
you maintain a position that requires your particular skillset, your employer 
demands you return to work immediately or be terminated.  You are unable to 
meet this demand because your spouse is in desperate need of your care.  As a 
result, you are terminated pursuant to your employer’s letter.5  
This fact scenario is one that frequently occurs, leaving families in a dire 
state of uncertainty.6  Employees caught in this situation may turn to litigation 
by filing a lawsuit against their former employers for interfering with their 
FMLA rights.7  Employers, in response, often argue that the employee’s FMLA 
 
1. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2018)). 
2. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2018).  
3. Id. § 2611(2)(A)(ii) (defining “eligible employee”).  
4. Id. § 2612(a)(1) (“[A]n eligible employee shall be entitled to . . . 12 workweeks of leave 
during any 12-month period . . . [i]n order to care for the spouse . . . [with] a serious health 
condition.”). 
5. This scenario presents a typical fact pattern illustrating the applicability of equitable estoppel 
in FMLA litigation.  See, e.g., Sean McCormick, Comment, An Uneven Playing Field: Public 
Employees are Disadvantaged in FMLA Eligibility/Notice Disputes, 36 U. DAYTON L. REV. 363, 363–
65 (2011) [hereinafter An Uneven Playing Field] (providing a stylistically similar introduction).  
However, this is not the only factual scenario that the doctrine can arise.  See David Nelson, Bridget 
R. Penick & Jodi D. Taylor, Enforcement, Remedies, and Other Litigation Issues, in THE FAMILY AND 
MEDICAL LEAVE ACT 11-1, 11-129–30 (William Bush, James M. Paul, Gina M. Chang, Melissa 
Pierre-Louis, Sara L. Faulman, & Susan Salzberg eds., 2d ed. 2017) (stating other relevant fact patterns 
where equitable estoppel can apply). 
6. A 2008 report by the Families and Work Institute found that one in five U.S. employers violate 
the FMLA.  Paul ODonnell, 20% of Employers Violate FMLA, Study Concludes, Cleveland.com (May 
27, 2008), https://www.cleveland.com/business/2008/05/20_of_employers_violate_fmla_s.html 
[https://perma.cc/3RXT-GN4J]; see also Nelson, Penick & Taylor, supra note 5, at 11-129, 11-129 
n.577 (citing cases when an employer has or allegedly has “fail[ed] to advise an employee regarding 
eligibility, or . . . [provided] inaccurate advice regarding eligibility for leave.”). 
7. Under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (2018), “[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere 
with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under [the FMLA].”  
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rights could not have been violated since the employee was not eligible for 
FMLA leave in the first place.8  In response, an employee can ask a court to 
invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel to bar the employer from asserting 
such an ineligibility defense after it originally made a misrepresentation which 
the employee detrimentally relied upon.9 
In general terms,10 equitable estoppel can be utilized when “[o]ne person 
makes a definite misrepresentation of fact to another person having reason to 
believe that the other will rely upon it and the other in reasonable reliance upon 
it does an act that would not constitute a tort if the misrepresentation were 
true.”11  Under this definition, the employee in the foregoing fact scenario could 
preclude her former employer from arguing that no FMLA violation occurred 
since she was never originally eligible.  However, such straightforward 
reasoning does not accurately depict how inconsistently equitable estoppel has 
been applied in FMLA litigation throughout the federal courts of appeals.  The 
 
Further, as the above hypothetical illustration demonstrates, termination for exercising one’s FMLA 
rights can constitute interference as well.  See id. § 2615(b).  
8. See, e.g., Plumley v. S. Container, Inc., 303 F.3d 364, 374 (1st Cir. 2002) (rejecting equitable 
estoppel argument because plaintiff did not have the option of working additional hours after the 
misrepresentation regarding basis for plaintiff's discharge); Duty v. Norton-Alcoa Proppants, 293 F.3d 
481, 493–94 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding employer equitably estopped from claiming plaintiff exhausted 
12-week FMLA leave prior to plaintiff's termination because employer previously informed plaintiff 
that the entire 34-week sick leave qualified as FMLA leave, and plaintiff had relied on representation); 
Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., 274 F.3d 706, 722–27 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying 
equitable estoppel to the issue of employee's eligibility where employer did not notify employee that 
she must work 1,250 hours to be FMLA eligible, and employee could have worked the necessary hours 
before taking leave); Gurley v. Ameriwood Indus., 232 F. Supp. 2d 969, 974 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (denying 
summary judgment for defendant on FMLA claim where it was reasonable to believe that if employer 
had not told plaintiff she was eligible for FMLA leave when she was, in fact, not eligible, plaintiff 
would have worked additional six days, rendering her eligible for leave). 
9. See infra note 11 (defining equitable estoppel).  
10. The definition of equitable estoppel has been defined differently by the courts; however, the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS has been frequently adopted.  See T. Leigh Anenson, The Triumph 
of Equity: Equitable Estoppel in Modern Litigation, 27 REV. LITIG. 377, 388–411 (2008) [hereinafter 
The Triumph of Equity]; An Uneven Playing Field, supra note 5, at 368–69; discussion infra Section 
II.C.3.  “An elasticity of elements” is an advantage when invoking equitable estoppel.  The Triumph of 
Equity, supra, at 439.  
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 894(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1979); see also Heckler v. 
Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 59 (1984); 3 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 804 (Spencer W. Symons 
ed., 5th ed. 1941); JAMES W. EATON, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 59 (1901).  
“[E]quitable estoppel has attained universal recognition but has not acquired a universal definition.  
There are conflicting cases on nearly every point of inquiry.”  The Triumph of Equity, supra note 10, 
at 410; see also Pickard v. Sears (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 179, 181 (K.B.) (defining equitable estoppel).  
Pickard remains the leading case on equitable estoppel.  The Triumph of Equity, supra note 10, at 38. 
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inconsistency demonstrated in this Comment evidences the need for additional 
analysis by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Part II of this Comment provides necessary background about the law of 
equity and the administration of the FMLA.  It continues with an analysis of 
equitable estoppel’s involvement in the Act.  The historical perspective 
provided by this Part portrays how the Supreme Court and Department of Labor 
(DOL) have made it unclear for circuit courts trying to determine the doctrine’s 
definition as well as its applicability to the FMLA. 
Part III looks for clarity by analyzing equitable estoppel’s involvement in a 
different federal law, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 197412 
(ERISA), in both the federal circuits and Supreme Court.  By doing so, this Part 
applies equitable estoppel principles from ERISA cases in order to first 
determine the doctrine’s applicability to the FMLA.  Then, this Part 
contemplates an appropriate standard for equitable estoppel under the FMLA 
and in particular, whether an employer must intend the misrepresentation of the 
employee’s FMLA eligibility before the employee can assert an equitable 
estoppel argument.  Lastly, this Part briefly summarizes and affirms the 
requirement that detrimental reliance be present before a court may invoke the 
doctrine.   
In general, this Comment illustrates the complexity of equitable estoppel.  
Its purpose is to provide reasoning in support of affirmative and counter 
arguments for the doctrine’s definition and application to claims under the 
FMLA.  The intention is to assist federal courts (including the U.S. Supreme 
Court) in analyzing the doctrine in a case of first impression, and ideally, to 
harmonize the law among jurisdictions.  Thus, this Comment focuses on two 
questions: first, whether equitable estoppel even applies to the FMLA, and 
second, if so, what standard is required to invoke the doctrine?13 
 
12. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 
U.S.C.).  ERISA was enacted to ensure the financial security of employees with respect to their 
participation in company-sponsored benefit plans.  29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012).  ERISA divides company-
sponsored benefit plans into two categories: (1) employee welfare benefit plans, and (2) employee 
pension benefit plans.  Id. § 1002(1)–(3).  
13. Chief Justice Roberts has discussed the importance of scholarship being practical and of 
service to the legal profession.  Law Prof. Ifill Challenges Chief Justice Roberts’ Take on Academic 
Scholarship, ACS BLOG: EXPERTFORUM (July 5, 2011), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/law-
prof-ifill-challenges-chief-justice-roberts-take-on-academic-scholarship/ [https://perma.cc/J3L2-
JYZJ]. 
[T]here is a great disconnect between the academy and the profession. . . .  Pick 
up a copy of any law review . . . and the first article is likely to be . . . the 
influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th Century 
Bulgaria . . . which I’m sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote it, 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Before determining equitable estoppel’s applicability and definition in the 
FMLA context, a brief discussion about the history of equity, the FMLA 
generally, and how the doctrine became involved in litigation of the Act is 
necessary.  This Part continues in the aforementioned sequence.  
A. Equity 
Because equitable estoppel is just one aspect of equity jurisprudence, a brief 
summary of the principles behind equity and the doctrines that have emerged 
from it is a necessary starting point.14  But “[a]n exact expression of 
equity . . . does not come easy.”15  Equity originated as private, judge-made 
law.16  Yet it is now pervasive across a variety of federal statutes.17  Its purpose 
is theoretically based on the idea that, without equity, the law would fail as 
being too general.18  Further, ethical considerations are at the heart of equity’s 
early traditions19 as its “cleansing power” serves as a way for courts to use their 
discretion “to prevent and remedy [a] problem.”20  In particular, doctrines and 
defenses that emerged from equity were based on principles of morality and 
 
but isn’t of much help to the bar. 
Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Susan Harthill, The Supreme Court Fills a Gaping Hole: 
CIGNA Corp. v. Amara Clarifies the Scope of Equitable Relief Under ERISA, 45 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 767, 772 (2012) (citing Chief Justice Roberts and incorporating a practical approach into her 
analysis of equitable relief in ERISA).   
14. T. Leigh Anenson, Announcing the “Clean Hands” Doctrine, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1827, 
1837 (2018) [hereinafter Announcing the “Clean Hands” Doctrine].  “Because the defense operates 
as a part of the whole of equity jurisprudence, arriving at a working definition of equity seems like a 
good place to begin.”  Id.  
15. Id.; see also Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 536 
(2016) (“Equity means many different and overlapping things.”); Hila Keren, Undermining Justice: 
The Two Rises of Freedom of Contract and the Fall of Equity, 2 CAN. J. COMP. & CONTEMP. L. 339, 
391 (2016) (noting that “the legal tradition captured by the term equity is rich, diverse, and much 
contested among scholars . . . .”). 
16. T. LEIGH ANENSON, JUDGING EQUITY: THE FUSION OF UNCLEAN HANDS IN U.S. LAW 147 
(2019) [hereinafter JUDGING EQUITY].  
17. See generally T. Leigh Anenson, Equitable Defenses in the Age of Statutes, 36 REV. LITIG. 
659 (2018) [hereinafter Age of Statutes] (using Supreme Court case law to develop a framework for 
determining the content of equitable defenses under federal statutes); T. Leigh Anenson, Statutory 
Interpretation, Judicial Discretion, and Equitable Defenses, 79 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (2017) [hereinafter 
Statutory Interpretation] (identifying and defending the Supreme Court’s assumption of equitable 
doctrines in federal statutes over nearly one hundred years). 
18. Announcing the “Clean Hands” Doctrine, supra note 14, at 1839; Statutory Interpretation, 
supra note 17, at 26–27.  
19. Announcing the “Clean Hands” Doctrine, supra note 14, at 1840.  
20. Id. at 1839. 
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fairness with a goal of “promoting fair play, protecting weaker parties, and 
preserving the integrity of the justice system.”21  By doing so, equity prevented 
“‘a wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of his [or her] transgression’ or, put 
differently, making the wrongdoer litigant ‘answer for his [or her] own 
misconduct in the action.’”22  More generally, these goals and principles of 
equity can be described as “anti-opportunism.”23  
Equity’s anti-opportunism stance and appeal to moral ideals is typically 
accomplished through the use of standards rather than rules.24  As a result, 
however, the preference for standards inevitably adds some 
ambiguity/uncertainty into the decision-making process.25  This decision-
making process also includes a trial judge’s discretion to not act; often called 
“residual discretion,” under which a court can refuse to invoke an equitable 
doctrine even when the conditions for its application are present.26 
Although equity was once a heavily analyzed concept, it has since been 
“overlooked” and “underestimated” by legal scholars in the modern age.27  Few 
treatises have been written or even updated.28  Law schools have eliminated 
courses in equity or combined them with remedies courses.29  Fewer scholars 
have specialized in equity in recent years.30  This declining attention has, in 
part, contributed to the courts confusion in defining and determining the scope 
 
21. T. Leigh Anenson, From Theory to Practice: Analyzing Equitable Estoppel Under a 
Pluralistic Model of Law, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 633, 663 (2007) [hereinafter From Theory to 
Practice].   
22. Announcing the “Clean Hands” Doctrine, supra note 14, at 1845 (footnotes omitted).  “The 
purpose of equity . . . was to stop strategic behavior” and stop a party attempting to “take[] advantage 
of their own wrong.”  Statutory Interpretation, supra note 17, at 6; see also Henry E. Smith, Why 
Fiduciary Law Is Equitable, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 261 (Andrew S. 
Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) (arguing that a general theme of equity is meant to prevent 
opportunism).  
23. Id. at 262–63; see also JUDGING EQUITY, supra note 16, at 20–21.  
24. JUDGING EQUITY, supra note 16, at 17; T. Leigh Anenson, Public Pensions and Fiduciary 
Law: A View From Equity, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 251, 264–65 (2017).  
25. Announcing the “Clean Hands” Doctrine, supra note 14, at 1834. 
26. Age of Statutes, supra note 17, at 680.  
27. Announcing the “Clean Hands” Doctrine, supra note 14, at 1852.  
28. Id. at 1852–53.  The last book devoted to equitable estoppel in American jurisprudence was 
published in 1913.  The Triumph of Equity, supra note 10, at 438 (citing MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL, OR OF INCONTESTABLE RIGHTS 603 (James N. Carter ed., 6th 
ed. 1913)).  
29. See Jerome Frank, Civil Law Influences on the Common Law—Some Reflections on 
“Comparative” and “Contrastive” Law, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 887, 895 n.43 (1956) (“In several of our 
leading university law schools, there is now no course on ‘equity.’”). 
30. Announcing the “Clean Hands” Doctrine, supra note 14, at 1857. 
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of equitable defenses.31  Equitable estoppel in both ERISA and FMLA litigation 
exemplifies this modern trend.32  As such, it is important that this field of law 
be reenergized with deeper insight and analysis.33  But before demonstrating 
the problem of equitable estoppel under the FMLA, a more detailed discussion 
about the Act and equitable estoppel’s development under it, is necessary. 
B. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 
The FMLA was established “to balance the demands of the workplace with 
the needs of families” by “entitl[ing] employees to take reasonable leave for 
medical reasons, for the birth or adoption of a child, and for the care of a child, 
spouse, or parent who has a serious health condition.”34  To qualify for FMLA 
leave, both the employer and employee must be deemed eligible under the 
Act.35  Specifically, private employers are eligible to offer FMLA leave if they 
employ fifty or more employees each day in twenty or more calendar 
workweeks of the previous year.36  On the other hand, an employee is eligible 
if they have worked for their employer for the previous twelve months and 
worked more than 1,250 hours during that twelve-month period.37  If these 
aforementioned eligibility requirements are met, the employee is entitled to a 
maximum of twelve weeks of leave during the one-year period following the 
start date of that leave.38  An eligible employee who is granted FMLA leave 
subsequently receives statutory protection from inequivalent job transfer or 
termination upon their timely return from FMLA leave.39  
 
31. Id.  
32. See discussion infra Part III.  
33. Dr. Anenson has dedicated much of her professional career to equity and has argued for more 
clarity in this area of the law.  
American equity is a subject of law worthy of study.  At a time when changes in 
the law are typically assumed to be made by legislatures, vast amounts of law 
continue to be created by judges.  Equity is one such area of judge-made law.  Its 
historically powerful role for the courts in fashioning reforms must never be 
forgotten.  Too little attention has been given to equitable principles and practices 
in the United States.  Equitable defenses, in particular, have largely gone 
unnoticed. 
Preface to JUDGING EQUITY, supra note 16, at xi.  Equity in the context of the FMLA and ERISA is 
likewise an integral analysis that can help cure the shortcomings of the law in recent times.  
34. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1)–(2) (2018).  
35. See id. § 2611(2), (4).  
36. Id. § 2611(4)(A)(i).  
37. Id. § 2611(2)(A).  
38. Id. § 2612(a).  
39. Id. § 2614(a).  
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Additionally, notice requirements exist under the FMLA.40  An employer is 
obligated to notify the employee if he or she has met the FMLA’s twelve-month 
length of employment and 1,250 hours of service threshold.41  Despite the clear 
calculation methodology to correctly determine length of employment and 
hours of service,42 employers still inaccurately notify employees of their FMLA 
eligibility or ineligibility.43  Such an inaccurate notification, whether ill-
intended or not,44 is grounds for an FMLA interference lawsuit.  Thus, if an 
employer is found to have “interfere[d] with, restrain[ed], or den[ied] the 
exercise of . . . [an employee’s FMLA] right[s],”45 it will be liable for 
“consequential damages and appropriate equitable relief.”46   
As the introduction illustrated, even where a clear miscalculation is evident, 
employers seeking to avoid liability still assert the defense that the employee 
was ineligible, and no miscalculation occurred.  Therefore, employees are 
forced to expend additional time and resources proving their eligibility in 
conjunction with litigating other FMLA interference elements.  This is 
particularly problematic when an employee has become unemployed—a likely 
outcome after an employer violates an employee’s FMLA rights—and a 
financial recovery is essential to pay for medical expenses and remain afloat.47  
 
40. 29 C.F.R. § 825.300 (2019).   
41. See id. § 825.300(b)(1) (explaining an employer’s requirements for notifying the employee 
of the employee’s eligibility).  
42. Id. § 825.110(c)(1) (The number of hours of service calculation is determined in accordance 
with “principles established under the Fair Labor Standards Act.”).   
43. See Nelson, Penick & Taylor, supra note 5 at 11-129 n.577, 11-132–33.  
44. In order to establish an FMLA interference claim, an employer’s interference need not be 
intentional.  See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a) (2018).  
45. Id. § 2615(a)(1).  This Comment does not address FMLA retaliation or equitable estoppel’s 
incorporation therein.  Id. §§ 2615(a)(2), 2615(b).  Nor does it address equitable estoppel in the context 
of a government employer’s violation of the FMLA.  For an understanding of the doctrine’s application 
to government employers, see generally An Uneven Playing Field, supra note 5.  
46. Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 86–87 (2002) (emphasis added) 
(summarizing 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)).  More specifically, damages include “wages, salary, 
employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost to such employee by reason of the 
violation.”  29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(I).  Absent an employer’s good faith intention to not violate 
the FMLA, an employee is also entitled to liquidated damages equal to the compensatory award.  
Id. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii).  A court may also award damages “for such equitable relief as may be 
appropriate, including employment, reinstatement, and promotion.”  Id. § 2617(a)(1)(B) (emphasis 
added).  
47. ABT ASSOCS. INC., THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT (FMLA) FINAL REPORT: 
DETAILED RESULTS APPENDIX 30 (rev. Apr. 18, 2014), 
https://www.dol.gov/asp/evaluation/fmla/fmla-detailed-results-appendix.pdf [https://perma.cc/2K3H-
3YSY] (finding that approximately 20% of employees that took FMLA leave were subsequently 
terminated).  
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In such a situation, the doctrine of equitable estoppel, barring an employer from 
asserting an ineligibility defense, becomes particularly valuable to an 
employee.  
C. The History of Equitable Estoppel and its Emergence in the FMLA 
Equitable estoppel’s roots as a remedy can be traced to the laws of England 
during the Enlightenment.48  Lord Kenyon’s definition of equitable estoppel 
still remains applicable today: “[i]t is ‘that a man [or woman] should not be 
permitted ‘to blow hot and cold’ with reference to the same transaction, or 
insist, at different times, on the truth of each of two conflicting allegations, 
according to the promptings of his [or her] private interest.”49  Initially, the 
doctrine’s application was limited to “deeds and records as well as a few matters 
in pais—by informal words or conduct.”50  In modern litigation, however, 
equitable estoppel has been more expansively applied at the discretion of a 
court.51 
In the late 1990s, the doctrine expanded to FMLA litigation and became 
quickly immersed in an array of factual contexts.52  However, circuit courts 
 
48. The Triumph of Equity, supra note 10, at 384.  “The inspiration for prohibiting inconsistent 
conduct or conflicting allegations came from the Latin maxim allegans contraria non est audiendus,” 
meaning “[h]e is not to be heard who alleges things contradictory to each other.”  Id. at 384, 384 n.17 
(quoting HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS 139 (4th ed. 1854)); see also Pickard v. 
Sears (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B.); Montefiori v. Montefiori (1762) 96 Eng. Rep. 203 (K.B.).  
“Montefiori was the first reported case at law invoking equitable estoppel.”  The Triumph of Equity, 
supra note 10, at 387.  Pickard became the leading case involving the doctrine by establishing a clear 
rule: 
[T]he rule of law is clear, that, where one by his words or conduct wilfully causes 
another to believe the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act 
on that belief, so as to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded 
from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same 
time. . . .  
Pickard, 112 Eng. Rep. at 181. 
49. Walter S. Beck, Estoppel Against Inconsistent Position in Judicial Proceedings, 9 BROOK. 
L. REV. 245, 245 (1940) (quoting HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS 119 (2d ed. 
1850).   
50. The Triumph of Equity, supra note 10, at 385 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted); see 
also POMEROY, supra note 11, at § 802.   
51. “Equity . . . extended the doctrine beyond its technical common law confines to a variety of 
conduct and activities.”  The Triumph of Equity, supra note 10, at 385; see also ROBERT MEGARRY & 
P.V. BAKER, SNELL’S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 562 (27th ed. 1973) (“[E]stoppel . . . was but a shadow 
of its modern self.”).  Since then, “courts . . . have been disseminating derivative theories of estoppel 
and expanding its application to new areas.”  From Theory to Practice, supra note 21, at 634.   
52. A LexisNexis and Westlaw search reveals that Hammon v. DHL Airways, Inc. was the first 
case before a circuit court to contemplate the application of equitable estoppel to the FMLA.  165 F.3d 
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have not been the only forum to weigh in on equitable estoppel in FMLA 
litigation.  The DOL has previously considered the doctrine’s applicability to 
the FMLA both implicitly by regulation53 and affirmatively in an opinion 
letter.54  Although the DOL’s viewpoint on equitable estoppel has since been 
withdrawn, its reasoning should not be ignored.55  Additionally, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has come close but never explicitly determined whether 
equitable estoppel is an available remedy under the FMLA.56  The requirements 
for invoking the doctrine in FMLA cases have therefore been left to the federal 
circuit courts, which have subsequently created uncertain and conflicting 
analyses.57   
 
441 (6th Cir. 1999).  Under 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(B) (2018), an employer who violates the FMLA is 
liable “for such equitable relief as may be appropriate, including employment, reinstatement, and 
promotion.”  This Comment only addresses the fact pattern discussed in the introduction.  However, a 
variety of other factual scenarios have involved equitable estoppel.  See Nelson, Penick & Taylor, 
supra note 5, at 11-129–30 nn.576–79.  For example, an employer is required to post notices in the 
workplace informing and summarizing “pertinent provisions of [the FMLA].”  29 U.S.C. § 2619(a); 
Nelson, Penick & Taylor, supra note 5, at 11-129–30 n.578.  But see Knussman v. Maryland, 16 F. 
Supp. 2d 601, 608 (D. Md. 1998) (“[A]n employer who fails to adequately post FMLA notices . . . is 
prevented from denying FMLA rights to an employee who fails to follow proper application 
procedures.”).  In order to qualify for FMLA leave, an employer may require an employee to obtain 
“certification issued by [a] health care provider.”  29 U.S.C. § 2613(a).  If “the employer has reason to 
doubt the validity of the certification provided,” the employer may require the employee to obtain a 
second opinion from another health care provider.  Id. § 2613(c)(1).  But see Sims v. Alameda-Contra 
Costa Transit Dist., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1262–63 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (employer estopped from 
challenging validity of employee-provided medical certification when employee provided adequate 
medical certification and employer failed to use second and third medical opinion provisions of the 
Act). 
53. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2242 (Jan. 6, 1995) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d)).  “If the employer confirms eligibility at the time the notice for 
leave is received, the employer may not subsequently challenge the employee’s eligibility. . . . If the 
employer fails to advise the employee whether the employee is eligible prior to the date the requested 
leave is to commence, the employee will be deemed eligible.  The employer may not, then, deny the 
leave.”  29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) (1995); see also discussion infra Section II.C.2.  
54. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter FMLA 2002-3 (July 19, 2002) 
[hereinafter July 19, 2002 Opinion Letter].  There is “the possibility that cases may be pursued, based 
on the principle of equitable estoppel . . . .”  Id.; discussion infra Section II.C.1.  
55. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1933, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 67,942 (Nov. 17, 2008) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 825). 
56. Case search on LexisNexis and Westlaw revealed no cases.  Ragsdale v. Wolverine World 
Wide, Inc. comes close to considering equitable estoppel but does not provide any analysis because the 
Court was determining the validity of a different FMLA regulation.  535 U.S. 81 (2002); discussion 
infra Section II.C.1.  
57. This is a common theme amongst equitable doctrines.  See Announcing the “Clean Hands” 
Doctrine, supra note 14, at 1834–35, 1837; Statutory Interpretation, supra note 17, at 14, 16–17.  
 
VAN KLEUNEN_24JAN20 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/24/2020  5:02 PM 
2019] WHAT THE FMLA CAN LEARN FROM ERISA 705 
Some circuit courts have expressly acknowledged equitable estoppel’s 
applicability to the FMLA and stated the required elements, but other circuits 
have expressed reluctance about following this trend.58  And further, many of 
the circuits who have discussed a definition for the doctrine, have been 
inconsistent.59  This Section continues with a general timeline of equitable 
estoppel’s emergence in the FMLA with its involvement in the DOL and the 
relevant federal circuit and Supreme Court cases.   
The FMLA instructed the Secretary of Labor to prescribe regulations to 
carry out the Act.60  Taking effect in 1995, the DOL issued a final regulation, 
which stated that if an employer failed to either timely or accurately advise an 
employee of FMLA eligibility, the employer was barred from “subsequently 
challeng[ing] the employee’s eligibility” if litigation ensued.61  Although the 
DOL did not outright state “equitable estoppel,” 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) clearly 
implied that an employee can assert the doctrine in response to an employer’s 
ineligibility defense.62  
 
58. From Theory to Practice, supra note 21, at 651 (“[L]ower courts will be understandably 
reluctant to deviate from existing decisions in distinguishing a case.”); see, e.g., Cowman v. Northland 
Hearing Ctrs., Inc., 628 F. App’x 669, 672 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished); Dawkins v. 
Fulton Cty. Gov’t, 733 F.3d 1084, 1089 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); Peters v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 533 
F.3d 594, 595, 598–601 (7th Cir. 2008); Banks v. Armed Forces Bank, 126 F. App’x 905, 906–07 
(10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished); Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Ill., 223 F.3d 579, 582 (7th Cir. 2000); 
see also From Theory to Practice, supra note 21, at 646–47 n.84–89 (citing cases demonstrating 
reluctance among courts to clarify the meaning and applicability of estoppel in the name of precedent).   
59. See infra notes 107–19 and accompanying text.  
60. 29 U.S.C. § 2654 (2018).  
61. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2,180, 2,242 (Jan. 6, 1995) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d)).  
62. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) (1993) (“[T]he employer may confirm the employee’s 
eligibility . . . on the date leave would commence[, but] . . . the employer may not subsequently 
challenge the employee’s eligibility.”), with EATON, supra note 11, at § 59 (“When one, by his words 
or conduct, voluntarily causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things, and induces 
him to act in that belief, so as to alter his own previous position, the former is precluded from asserting, 
as against the latter, a different state of things as existing at the same time.”); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 894(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“If one person makes a definite 
misrepresentation of fact to another person having reason to believe that the other will rely upon it and 
the other in reasonable reliance upon it does an act that would not constitute a tort if the 
misrepresentation were true . . . .”); Equitable Estoppel, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) 
(Equitable estoppel is “[t]he doctrine by which a person may be precluded by [their] act or conduct, or 
silence when it is [their] duty to speak, from asserting a right that [they] otherwise would have had.”); 
POMEROY, supra note 11, at § 804 (“Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party 
whereby he is absolutely precluded . . . from asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise 
existed . . . against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led 
thereby to change his position for the worse . . . .”).  
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Following the enactment of the FMLA and the DOL’s subsequent 
regulation, three circuit courts found that the DOL’s promulgation of 29 
C.F.R. § 825.110(d) exceeded its authority because it allowed employees to 
become “eligible under the FMLA [when they did] not meet the statute’s clear 
eligibility requirements.”63  More specifically, as the Seventh Circuit in 
Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank–Illinois64 stated, 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) was 
clearly “chang[ing] the Act . . . [instead of] address[ing] an interpretative issue 
that the statute leaves open.”65  The court further reasoned that an employee 
could work for less than the 1,250 hour-requirement, inquire about their FMLA 
eligibility, and if the employer merely neglected to inform that employee of 
their obvious ineligibility, the employer would still be liable, even when the 
employee suffers no harm at all.66   
These three circuit courts that struck down 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d)’s 
validity compared it to equitable estoppel and acknowledged its possible 
applicability to the FMLA; however, they took issue with the fact that 29 
C.F.R. § 825.110(d) did not affirmatively require detrimental reliance.  The 
Dormeyer court stated: 
If detrimental reliance were required [on the part of the 
employee acting on the employer’s assurance of eligibility], 
the regulation could be understood as creating a right of 
estoppel . . . and such a right might be thought both consistent 
with the statute and a reasonable method of implementing it, 
and so within the [DOL’s] rulemaking powers.67  
 
63. Woodford v. Cmty. Action of Greene Cty., Inc., 268 F.3d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 2001).  The Court 
of Appeals for the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits questioned and ultimately found that the 
DOL had exceeded its authority.  See id.; Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Ill., 223 F.3d 579, 582 (7th Cir. 
2000); see also Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 796–97 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(“Congress could have, but did not, confer the right to family medical leave on any employee who did 
not receive a prompt response from the employer to her leave request.  There is no ambiguity in the 
statute concerning eligibility for family medical leave, no gap to be filled.”).  The Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit, by way of Dormeyer, led the analysis of 29 C.F.R § 825.110(d) prior to Ragsdale 
v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81 (2002).  
64. 223 F.3d 579.  
65. Dormeyer, 223 F.3d at 582 (citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25 (1999); 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984); NLRB v. GranCare, 
Inc., 170 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc); City of Chi. v. FCC, 199 F.3d 424, 428 (7th Cir. 
1999)). 
66. Id. 
67. Woodford, 268 F.3d at 57 (quoting Dormeyer, 223 F.3d at 582).  The Second Circuit 
ultimately denounces Woodford’s reasoning in Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., 274 
F.3d 706, 723 (2d Cir. 2001); see also discussion supra Section II.C.3.  
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Nonetheless, the Dormeyer court found “nothing in the [FMLA] that relates 
to misleading eligibility notices or absences of notice.”68  In light of Dormeyer 
and the other circuit courts following similar reasoning, it appeared that 29 
C.F.R. § 825.110(d)’s implicit equitable estoppel language may not be 
authorized by the FMLA, or at a minimum, when detrimental reliance is absent.  
This determination of equitable estoppel’s application to the FMLA became 
even more uncertain when the U.S. Supreme Court in Ragsdale v. Wolverine 
World Wide, Inc.69 interpreted the meaning of a similarly worded regulation in 
29 C.F.R § 825.   
1. Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc. 
In Ragsdale, the employer granted an employee thirty consecutive weeks 
of unpaid sick leave under the employer’s own unpaid leave policy; however, 
the employer failed to notify the employee that twelve of those weeks were 
designated as FMLA leave.70  When the employer informed the employee that 
she had exhausted all unpaid leave, the employee requested additional leave or 
permission to work part-time.71  The employer denied the employee’s request 
and subsequently terminated her employment after she failed to return to 
work.72  
The employee thereafter filed a lawsuit relying on 29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a),73 
which stated “if an employee takes [paid or unpaid] leave and the employer 
does not designate the leave as FMLA leave, the leave taken does not count 
against an employee’s FMLA entitlement.”74  The employee argued that her 
leave did not count against her FMLA entitlement under 29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a) 
because her employer failed to notify her that twelve weeks of the absence 
would in fact count as FMLA leave.75  
The Court determined that the employee was not entitled to additional 
FMLA leave because “[29 C.F.R. §] 825.700(a) effect[ed] an impermissible 
alteration of the statutory framework” and was outside the DOL’s scope of 
authority under the FMLA.76  By doing so, the Court determined that 29 
 
68. Dormeyer, 223 F.3d at 582. 
69. 535 U.S. 81 (2002).  
70. Id. at 84–85.  During the entire thirty-week period, the employer maintained the employee’s 
position and continued her health benefits.  Id. at 85. 
71. Id. at 84–85.  
72. Id. at 85.  
73. Id. at 84–85. 
74. Id. at 88 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a) (2001)).  
75. Id. at 85. 
76. Id. at 96.  “The FMLA guaranteed [Plaintiff] 12—not 42—weeks of leave.”  Id.  
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C.F.R. § 825.700(a) had “relieve[d] employees from the burden of proving any 
real impairment of their rights and resulting prejudice.”77  The Court also 
reasoned that “[29 C.F.R. §] 825.700(a) enforce[ed] the individualized notice 
requirement in a way that contradict[ed] and undermin[ed] the FMLA’s pre-
existing remedial scheme.”78 
The Court’s reasoning potentially implicated 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d)’s 
valid existence.79  Thus, in response to Ragsdale’s invalidation of 29 
C.F.R. § 825.700(a), the DOL released an Opinion Letter regarding an 
employee’s use of equitable estoppel for FMLA violations.80  The Opinion 
Letter stated, in part, 
[T]he possibility that cases may be pursued, based 
on . . . equitable estoppel, where the employer’s failure to 
properly advise the employee of FMLA eligibility/ineligibility 
is determined to have interfered with the employee’s 
rights . . . , and the employee could have taken other action had 
[they] been properly notified.81 
Notably, neither 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) nor Ragsdale made explicit 
mention of equitable estoppel,82 and it appears the DOL, through discretionary 
 
77. Id. at 90.  
78. Id. at 92.  
79. The Court did not invalidate any of the regulations regarding notice, which would have 
certainly encompassed 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d).  Id. at 88.  The Court instead stated that any 
“categorical penalty the Secretary imposes . . . is contrary to the Act’s remedial design.”  Id.  Recall 
that Woodford, Dormeyer, and Brungart each determined that the DOL acted outside the scope of its 
authority when it promulgated 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d).  Woodford v. Cmty. Action of Greene Cty., 
Inc., 268 F.3d 51, 57 (2nd Cir. 2001); Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Ill., 223 F.3d 579, 582–83 (7th Cir. 
2000); Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 796–97 (11th Cir. 2000). 
80. July 19, 2002 Opinion Letter, supra note 54.  The DOL’s Opinion Letter in response to 
Ragsdale stated: 
In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, the Department believes it is 
inappropriate, in most cases, to pursue compliance actions in instances where the 
employee has clearly taken FMLA leave and the employer has failed to designate 
the leave as such.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Ragsdale may leave open the 
possibility that cases may be pursued, based on the principle of equitable 
estoppel, where the failure to designate the leave as FMLA-qualifying interfered 
with the employee’s exercise of FMLA rights . . . and the employee could have 
taken other action had he [or she] known that the leave would count against his 
[or her] FMLA entitlement. 
Id. 
81. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter FMLA 2002-5-A (Aug. 6, 2002) 
[hereinafter Aug. 6, 2002 Opinion Letter].  
82. See Ragsdale, 535 U.S. 81; 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) (1995).  
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language,83 was delicately maintaining some form of regulatory bar to an 
employer’s ineligibility defense after the Court’s ruling.  Further, the Opinion 
Letter did not specify any part of the FMLA or related regulations that 
authorized the DOL to regulate equitable estoppel.84  Until 2008–2009, this 
Opinion Letter was the last time the DOL officially spoke on equitable estoppel 
and left all interpretation and application of the doctrine to the courts.   
2. DOL’s 2009 Regulation 
Over six years after the DOL’s Opinion Letter and Ragsdale, the DOL 
began contemplating a regulation that more clearly comported with the 
Ragsdale reasoning.85  Because of Ragsdale’s invalidation of 29 
C.F.R. § 825.700(a), 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) became collateral damage in 
2009.86  Although the Ragsdale Court did not address 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) 
directly, it acknowledged that any “categorical penalty” for a violation of the 
notice and designation provisions in the regulation would run “contrary to the 
[FMLA]’s remedial design” and beyond the DOL’s rulemaking authority.87  
The DOL thus interpreted 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) to be a categorical penalty.88 
As a result, the DOL promulgated a final rule eliminating the language that 
“deem[ed]” an employee eligible for FMLA leave, regardless of hours worked, 
when the employer failed to notify the employee.89  The DOL determined that 
“it [did] not have the regulatory authority to deem employees eligible for 
FMLA leave who [did] not meet the 12-month/1,250-hour requirements, even 
where the employer fails to provide the required eligibility notices to employees 
or provides incorrect information.”90  Thus, in the DOL’s view, employers 
 
83. “The Supreme Court’s decision in Ragsdale may leave open the possibility that cases may 
be pursued, based on the principle of equitable estoppel . . . .”  Aug. 6, 2002 Opinion Letter, supra note 
81 (emphasis added).  
84. See 29 C.F.R. § 825; Aug. 6, 2002 Opinion Letter, supra note 81.  
85. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 7,876 (proposed Feb. 11, 2008) (to 
be codified in scattered sections of 29 C.F.R. pt. 825). 
86. See Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 96.  Compare 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) (2008), with 29 
C.F.R. § 825.110(d) (2010).  
87. Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 88, 91–96.  
88. See Aug. 6, 2002 Opinion Letter, supra note 81. 
89. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1933, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 67,942 (Nov. 17, 2008) (to be 
codified in scattered sections of 29 C.F.R. pt. 825).  
90. Id. (emphasis added).  
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retained the freedom to assert an ineligibility defense in instances where it 
provided incorrect eligibility information to an employee.91  
Despite this employer-friendly alteration, the DOL possibly found solace 
in promulgating 29 C.F.R. §§ 300(e) and 400(c) as replacements to the former 
estoppel-like regulation.92  Under 29 C.F.R. § 300(e), the “[f]ailure to follow 
the notice requirements . . . may constitute an interference with, restraint, or 
denial of the exercise of an employee’s FMLA rights, . . . [and] [a]n employer 
may be liable . . . for appropriate equitable . . . relief.”93  29 C.F.R. § 400(c) 
briefly expands on “appropriate equitable relief” as being available “where no 
such tangible loss has occurred, such as when FMLA leave was unlawfully 
denied.”94  29 C.F.R. § 400(c) continued, “[w]hen appropriate, the employee 
may also obtain appropriate equitable relief, such as employment, 
reinstatement, and promotion.”95  
During the DOL’s comment period, one comment suggested that a 
clarification to the FMLA’s definition of “equitable relief” was necessary in 
light of striking the “deeming” language.96  The DOL declined to respond to the 
comment by broadly citing a court’s discretion to “order any appropriate 
relief.”97  Moreover, the DOL also received comments on 29 C.F.R. § 825.300, 
one of the replacement regulations to 29 C.F.R. § 825.110.98  These comments 
stated that the “equitable relief language for harm caused by interference with 
FMLA rights [was] problematic” and “too vague.”99  Another comment called 
29 C.F.R. § 825.300 “particularly troubling” and objected to the DOL proposal 
stating that “interference with a ‘right’ suggests something more than failure to 
provide notice.”100  
 
91. The DOL stated that eliminating the “deeming” provisions from 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.110(c) 
and (d) “should have no impact on employers or employees because the [DOL] believes that it cannot 
enforce the deeming provisions of the current rule in light of the . . . Ragsdale decision.”  Id. at 68,048.  
92. Id. at 68,059; 68,068; 68,097; 68,106–07. 
93. Id. at 68,097. 
94. Id. at 68,106. 
95. Id. at 68,106–07. 
96. Id. at 67,999.  Specifically, the commentator asked the DOL to make clear that “one of the 
equitable remedies an employee may obtain is additional leave.”  Id.  
97. Id.  “As in any action arising under the FMLA, any remedy is specific to the facts of the 
individual’s circumstance, and a court may order any appropriate relief.  Therefore, no change . . . is 
necessary.”  Id.  
98. Id. at 68,000. 
99. Id. 
100. Id.  
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Once again, beginning in 2009 when the final rule became effective, the 
DOL left courts with limited clarity regarding how to interpret “appropriate 
equitable relief” under the FMLA. 
3. Circuit Courts and Equitable Estoppel 
Irrespective of the DOL’s regulations, and to a somewhat lesser extent, the 
Court’s precedent in Ragsdale, circuit courts have exerted their own approach 
to equitable estoppel based on their inherent equitable authority in common 
law.101  As a result, circuit courts have analyzed the doctrine in FMLA litigation 
at various levels, both in application and definition.102   
Regarding application, as previously mentioned, the Seventh Circuit in 
Peters v. Gilead Sciences, Inc. stated that it is “assumed but not decided” that 
the doctrine can be invoked “to block a statutory defense to FMLA 
eligibility.”103  The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have similarly exhibited 
uncertainty about the doctrine’s applicability to the FMLA.104  Specifically, the 
Tenth Circuit in Banks v. Armed Force Banks acknowledged that it has “not yet 
determined whether equitable estoppel applies in a FMLA action.”105  The 
Eleventh Circuit feared creating “a new federal common law equitable estoppel 
applicable to the FMLA.” 106 
 
101. As the doctrine has evolved, courts have implicitly opted for flexibility over predictability.  
Triumph of Equity, supra note 10, at 404–05.   
102. Professor Bray frames the possibility of equitable remedies under an equitable relief statute 
with a two-step inquiry: “1. Is the requested relief equitable? [and] 2. What principles shape the 
availability of equitable relief?”  Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. 
L. REV. 997, 1008 (2015) [hereinafter New Equity] (emphasis omitted). 
103. Peters v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 533 F.3d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 2008).  
104. See Cowman v. Northland Hearing Ctrs., Inc., 628 F. App’x 669, 672 (11th Cir. 2015) (per 
curiam) (unpublished); Dawkins v. Fulton Cty. Gov’t, 733 F.3d 1084, 1089 (11th Cir. 2013) (per 
curiam); Banks v. Armed Forces Bank, 126 F. App’x 905, 906–07 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished).  
“[S]ome district courts in the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have been reluctant to apply equitable 
estoppel in the absence of precedent in the circuit.”  Nelson, Penick & Taylor, supra note 5, at 11-131 
n.588. 
105. Banks, 126 F. App’x at 906–07.  Interestingly, Banks cited cases from the Second and 
Eighth Circuits that had already recognized equitable estoppel’s application to the FMLA, suggesting 
that if confronted with the application of equitable estoppel, it would follow the reasoning set forth in 
those cases.  See id. at 907 (citing Duty v. Norton-Alcoa Proppants, 293 F.3d 481, 493–94 (8th Cir. 
2002); Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., 274 F.3d 706, 722–27 (2d Cir. 2001)).  
106. Dawkins, 733 F.3d at 1091.  The court continued, “[t]he times when we should create new 
federal common law are ‘few and restricted.’”  Id.  Because this case is against a government employer, 
equitable estoppel is not a remedy that can be sought by an employee.  See OPM v. Richmond, 496 
U.S. 414, 421–22, 433 (1990) (repeating Heckler’s “affirmative misconduct” standard but suggesting 
a heightened standard exists to invoke the doctrine: “To open the door to estoppel claims would only 
invite endless litigation over both real and imagined claims of misinformation by disgruntled 
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Regarding a definition, other circuit courts have determined equitable 
estoppel’s applicability to the FMLA and even developed elements for invoking 
the doctrine.  Specifically, circuit courts have accepted the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts’ definition107 of equitable estoppel that was originally adopted 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Heckler v. Community Health Services of 
Crawford Cty.108  However, each circuit court that has adopted the Heckler 
standard has also incorporated their own reasoning by adding additional 
elements or defining the doctrine in more detail.109  The most distinctive 
element among these circuits is the standard of intent required to make out a 
showing of equitable estoppel.   
For example, in Dobrowski v. Jay Dee Contractors, Inc.,110 the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in considering the requirements for the doctrine 
in FMLA cases, affirmatively rejected circuit precedent in ERISA equitable 
estoppel cases that required an employer’s express intent to mislead.111  As a 
 
citizens . . . .”); Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 58, 60 (1984) (in dicta, requiring 
“affirmative misconduct” by the government be shown in order to invoke the doctrine); see also Nagel 
v. Acton-Boxborough Reg’l Sch. Dist., 576 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2009); An Uneven Playing Field, supra 
note 5, at 384–85.  Nonetheless, Dawkins is significant because it provides more comprehensive 
reasoning for how the Eleventh Circuit would analyze the doctrine against a private employer.  In an 
unpublished opinion just two years after Dawkins, the Eleventh Circuit punted on the doctrine’s 
application to a private employer in an FMLA case citing Dawkins as support.  See Cowman, 628 F. 
App’x at 672.   
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 894(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“If one person makes 
a definite misrepresentation of fact to another person having reason to believe that the other will rely 
upon it and the other in reasonable reliance upon it does an act . . . , the first person is not entitled . . . to 
regain property or its value that the other acquired by the act, if the other in reliance upon the 
misrepresentation and before discovery of the truth has so changed his position that it would be unjust 
to deprive him of that which he thus acquired.”).  
108. The Supreme Court in Heckler adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ definition of 
equitable estoppel.  467 U.S. at 59.  However, Heckler contemplated the use of the doctrine to estop 
the government’s claim to recover Medicare funds issued to a recipient.  Id. at 53–58.  In addition to 
the factual context being completely distinct from the FMLA, estopping the government requires a 
wholly different analysis where “affirmative misconduct” by the government must exist.  Id. at 58.  
“Affirmative misconduct” has remained a requirement when a party attempts to invoke equitable 
estoppel in FMLA litigation but has largely been applied to government employers as well.  Id.; e.g., 
Nagel, 576 F.3d at 4; see also An Uneven Playing Field, supra note 5, at 381, 384–85 (arguing for the 
elimination of “affirmative misconduct” in FMLA equitable estoppel litigation).   
109. See, e.g., Dobrowski v. Jay Dee Contractors, Inc., 571 F.3d 551, 555–57 (6th Cir. 2009); 
Minard v. ITC Deltacom Commc’ns, Inc., 447 F.3d 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2006); Duty, 293 F.3d at 493–
94.  Although before Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81 (2002), see also Kosakow, 
274 F.3d at 725. 
110. 571 F.3d 551. 
111. Id. at 555–57.  This deviation is noteworthy because of the similarities that exist between 
ERISA and the FMLA’s remedial statutes.  See discussion infra Part III.  The distinction between 
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result, Dobrowski organized the Heckler standard into three elements: “(1) a 
definite misrepresentation as to a material fact, (2) a reasonable reliance on the 
misrepresentation, and (3) a resulting detriment to the party reasonably relying 
on the misrepresentation.”112  The Eighth Circuit in Duty v. Norton-Alcoa 
Proppants also applied this test to its FMLA equitable estoppel analysis.113 
However, Dobrowski and Duty’s adoption of Heckler is likely a “floor” to 
the standard of intent.  On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit in Plumley v. Southern Container, Inc.114 suggests a slightly heightened 
intent standard in its analysis.  The Plumley court required that: 
(1) the party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) that party 
must intend that his conduct be acted upon (or must act in a 
way that leads the party asserting the estoppel to believe it is 
so intended); (3) the latter must be ignorant of the true facts; 
and (4) he must rely on the estopping conduct to his 
detriment.115  
By stating “the party to be estopped must know the facts,” Plumley arguably 
requires a standard of intent above that required in Heckler (and Dobrowski and 
Duty) but below an express intent to mislead.116  The Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits have also provided similar tests to Plumley, emphasizing the 
employer’s knowledge and intent to mislead without expressly naming it as an 
element.117  Under Dawkins v. Fulton County Government,118 the Eleventh 
Circuit’s FMLA equitable estoppel elements include:  
 
ERISA and FMLA as to the intent element in equitable estoppel in the Sixth Circuit still remains today.  
Compare Dobrowski, 571 F.3d at 557 (requiring only a “definite misrepresentation”), with Cataldo v. 
U.S. Steel Corp., 676 F.3d 542, 553 (6th Cir. 2012) (requiring fraud or an intent to deceive).  
112. Dobrowski, 571 F.3d at 557 (citing Minard, 447 F.3d at 359).  
113. 293 F.3d at 493–94.  Interestingly, the Second and Fifth Circuits both cite to Heckler but 
also required that the employer “ha[ve] reason to believe that [the employee or the other party] will 
rely upon [the misrepresentation].”  Kosakow, 274 F.3d at 726 (emphasis added); Minard, 447 F.3d at 
359 (emphasis added).  Dobrowski and Duty do not acknowledge an employer’s “reason to believe” in 
their elemental standards.  Dobrowski, 571 F.3d at 555, 557; Duty, 293 F.3d at 493–94.  Yet, Dobrowski 
still cites to Minard when stating its elemental test.  Dobrowski, 571 F.3d at 557. 
114. 303 F.3d 364 (1st Cir. 2002). 
115. Id. at 374 (emphasis added).  
116. Id.  
117. See Cowman v. Northland Hearing Ctrs., Inc., 628 F. App’x 669, 672 (11th Cir. 2015) (per 
curiam) (unpublished); Dawkins v. Fulton Cty. Gov’t, 733 F.3d 1084, 1089 (11th Cir. 2013) (per 
curiam); Banks v. Armed Forces Bank, 126 F. App’x 905, 906–07 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished).  
Despite uncertainty as to the doctrine’s applicability to the FMLA, the court still articulated a five-
element test that includes the party to be estopped must intend the misrepresentation be acted on.  
Cowman, 628 F. App’x at 672; Dawkins, 733 F.3d at 1089. 
118. 733 F.3d 1084.  Although this is a case with a government employer (which means the 
equitable estoppel analysis changes), this case has still been reaffirmed in unpublished opinions, 
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(1) the party to be estopped misrepresented material facts; (2) 
the party to be estopped was aware of the true facts; (3) the 
party to be estopped intended that the misrepresentation be 
acted on or had reason to believe the party asserting the 
estoppel would rely on it; (4) the party asserting the estoppel 
did not know, nor should it have known, the true facts; and (5) 
the party asserting the estoppel reasonably and detrimentally 
relied on the misrepresentation.119 
Therefore, it is clear that circuit courts have reached different conclusions 
about equitable estoppel in FMLA litigation.   
The main distinctions among the circuit courts is first whether the doctrine 
is even applicable to the FMLA, and if so, what test should be used in order to 
invoke the doctrine?120  And within that test, should an employee be required 
to show that the employer intended to mislead in its misrepresentation?  The 
analysis below strives to answer these questions.  At minimum, the analysis can 
inform circuit courts assessing the doctrine under a case of first impression and 
otherwise help to harmonize jurisprudence in those courts that have addressed 
the issues. 
III. RECONCILING EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IN FMLA LITIGATION 
The cases discussed above summarize the complexity of involving 
equitable estoppel in FMLA litigation.  This complexity is more pronounced 
because of inconsistent analyses among the circuits as to the applicability and 
definition of equitable estoppel in the FMLA.121  Given the evolution of 
estoppel and its equitable nature, along with the absence of sustained 
commentary, this complexity should come as no surprise.122 
 
suggesting that this test will be used in private employer cases.  For a discussion about equitable 
estoppel in the case of a government employer, see generally Uneven Playing Field, supra note 5.  
119. Dawkins, 733 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Busby v. JRHBW Realty, Inc., 513 F.3d 1314, 1326 
(11th Cir. 2008)). 
120. Recall Professor Bray’s initial two-step inquiry.  New Equity, supra note 102, at 1008; see 
also discussion supra Section II.C.3.  
121. FMLA litigation illustrates the history of equity more generally.  A less rigorous analyses 
among courts in conjunction with limited academic scholarship on equitable remedies will only 
continue misunderstanding of the doctrine and breed further inconsistency.  Announcing the “Clean 
Hands” Doctrine, supra note 14, at 1857.  
122. See The Triumph of Equity, supra note 10, at 390–92 (analyzing equitable estoppel across 
a variety of subjects); discussion supra Part II.  
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But courts must willingly take the onus of the “chao[tic]” state of this 
doctrine and strive to clarify its application and meaning.123  More specifically, 
this “chaos” is most evident when making two particular inquiries about 
equitable estoppel in the FMLA context.  First, does equitable estoppel apply 
to the FMLA?  Second, must intent to mislead be a required element of the 
doctrine or does a more balanced approach exist?  In order to most effectively 
answer these two interpretative questions, this Part briefly incorporates 
equitable estoppel’s application and definition in ERISA litigation. 
A. Does Equitable Estoppel Even Apply to the FMLA? 
As some circuit courts have discussed, whether equitable estoppel even 
applies to FMLA litigation is a paramount and foremost inquiry.124  Although 
no circuit court has expressly declined to adopt the doctrine in FMLA 
litigation,125 it is reasonable for courts to have nonetheless exhibited some 
uncertainty.126  This uncertainty has long been rooted in the doctrine’s 
expansive history to an array of legal areas127 and the statutory construction of 
the FMLA’s equitable relief statute—both of which present valid arguments for 
and against applying the doctrine to the FMLA.  In general terms, equitable 
estoppel has always maintained a “liberal[]” core, suggesting that the doctrine 
applies regardless of the law at issue.128  However, the FMLA’s statutory 
language defining “equitable relief as may be appropriate”129 may also lead a 
court to reasonably interpret “equitable relief” as restricted to the enumerated 
terms that subsequently follow: “employment, reinstatement, and 
promotion.”130  Such an interpretation would position a court to reasonably 
 
123. The Triumph of Equity, supra note 10, at 410; see also Announcing the “Clean Hands” 
Doctrine, supra note 14, at 1889–90; New Equity, supra note 102, at 1044 (arguing that “the Court 
should clarify . . . the use of traditional equitable presumptions . . . .”).   
124. See Cowman v. Northland Hearing Ctrs., Inc., 628 F. App’x 669, 672 (11th Cir. 2015) (per 
curiam) (unpublished); Dawkins v. Fulton Cty. Gov’t, 733 F.3d 1084, 1091 (11th Cir. 2013) (per 
curiam); Banks v. Armed Forces Bank, 126 F. App’x 905, 906–07 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished); 
discussion supra Part II. 
125. Nelson, Penick & Taylor, supra note 5, at 11-130. 
126. See discussion supra Part II.  
127. “As rules age, courts question their validity.  As standards age, courts incrementally 
determine their meaning.”  From Theory to Practice, supra note 21 at 642–43 (footnotes omitted).  
128. The Triumph of Equity, supra note 10, at 390. 
129. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(B) (2018).  
130. Id.  “[W]here general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general 
words are construed to embrace only objects similar . . . to those . . . enumerated by the . . . specific 
words.”  Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 
384 (2003) (quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114–115 (2001)).  But see 
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deem equitable estoppel unauthorized by the FMLA.  Even so, this originalist 
argument is likely an unsuccessful one.  Accordingly, this Section reaches a 
conclusion about equitable estoppel’s applicability to the FMLA.  First, the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Ragsdale, the DOL’s regulations, and the many 
circuit court holdings demonstrate that equitable estoppel likely applies to the 
FMLA.  Second, the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis of ERISA’s similar 
equitable relief statute further engrains the doctrine into the FMLA.   
1. Ragsdale 
Even though it did not discuss equitable estoppel, Ragsdale is the most 
relevant U.S. Supreme Court precedent for determining equitable estoppel’s 
application to the FMLA.131  In its reasoning, the Court stated that in order to 
show “prejudice[]”132 against an employee to support an FMLA interference 
claim, the “judge or jury must ask what steps the employee would have taken 
had circumstances been different.”133  By referencing “prejudice[]” and in-part, 
stating the definition of equitable estoppel, the Court’s reasoning could very 
well apply to the doctrine in the FMLA context.134  Additionally, despite 
ultimately striking down the regulation, the Court’s reason for doing so was 
because the DOL acted outside its authority by “enact[ing] rules” that make 
“determinations for the courts.”135  Thus, the Court’s reasoning suggests that 
equitable estoppel can apply to the FMLA but must be invoked by a court, not 
the DOL.  
However, equitable estoppel is not in the clear just yet—the Court’s opinion 
also provides room for hesitancy.  Specifically, the Court quotes support from 
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.136 when discussing equitable relief under the 
FMLA.137  The Court seems to limit “[a] trial judge’s discretion . . . to order 
 
Statutory Interpretation, supra note 17, at 10–12 (finding an equitable relief statute’s silence regarding 
equitable defenses does not necessarily preclude such defenses, like equitable estoppel, from being 
read into a statute).  The U.S. Supreme Court does exactly this in CIGNA Corp. v. Amara.  563 U.S. 
421, 443 (2011) (reading equitable estoppel into 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), which vaguely grants 
“appropriate equitable relief” for ERISA violations); see also discussion infra Section III.A.2.a.   
131. See generally Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide Inc., 535 U.S. 81 (2002).  
132. “[29 U.S.C.] § 2617 provides no relief unless the employee has been prejudiced by the 
violation.”  Id.at 89.   
133. Id. at 91.  
134. Id. at 89. 
135. Id. at 91–92.  
136. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).  
137. Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 89 (citing Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 292–93).  Waffle House analyzed 
the equitable relief statute under the American with Disabilities Act.  Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 
327 (1990) (codified in 42 U.S.C §§ 12101–12213). 
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reinstatement and award damages in an amount warranted by the facts of that 
case.”138  This was the only kind of equitable relief discussed by Waffle House 
or Ragsdale, which implies that the Court may see a statutory limitation on its 
ability to invoke equitable estoppel in FMLA cases.139  Nonetheless, Ragsdale’s 
discussion on the FMLA’s equitable relief statute seems to include equitable 
estoppel; however, no evidence clearly supports such a determination for all 
FMLA contexts.  Therefore, an analysis of the Court’s assessment of the 
doctrine in ERISA may illuminate the doctrine’s applicability to the FMLA. 
2. ERISA 
Because Ragsdale is not directly on point and the DOL has since rescinded 
its equitable estoppel-like regulation (29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d)), in order to 
determine the doctrine’s FMLA applicability, a lower court would be well-
reasoned to review the Court’s analysis of a closely related federal equitable 
relief statute.140  A line of cases141 in which the Court analyzed “appropriate 
equitable relief”142 under ERISA purport that equitable estoppel would likely 
apply to the FMLA and also dispel arguments to the contrary. 
 
138. Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 89 (quoting Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 292–93) (emphasis added). 
139. When quoting Waffle House, the Court states reinstatement as an equitable remedy but also 
includes “damages in an amount.”  Id.  “Amount” does not imply equitable relief but rather legal relief 
in the form of monetary damages.  This distinction is noteworthy.  See discussion infra Section III.A.2.  
Also, recall that the regulation struck down by the Ragsdale Court only contained similar language to 
equitable estoppel’s definition and the DOL’s estoppel-like regulation (29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d)), which 
was also eliminated in 2009.  Compare 29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a) (1993) (“If an employee takes paid or 
unpaid leave and the employer does not designate the leave as FMLA leave, the leave taken does not 
count against an employee’s FMLA entitlement.”), with 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) (1993) (“If the 
employer confirms eligibility[,] . . . the employer may not subsequently challenge the employee’s 
eligibility.”).  
140. Case search on LexisNexis and Westlaw reveals no cases before the U.S. Supreme Court 
applying equitable estoppel in an FMLA context.  However, equity is trans-substantive and equitable 
statutes should be analyzed “as an interlock[ed] web of precepts.”  Announcing the Clean Hands 
Doctrine, supra note 14, at 1835–36, 1838–39; see also Dobrowski v. Jay Dee Contractors, Inc., 571 
F.3d 551, 554–57 (6th Cir. 2009) (analyzing the standard for equitable estoppel in ERISA to determine 
its applicability and appropriate standard in the FMLA context); JUDGING EQUITY, supra note 16, at 
29; Age of Statutes, supra note 17, at 666–68; T. Leigh Anenson & Gideon Mark, Inequitable Conduct 
in Retrospective: Understanding Unclean Hands in Patent Remedies, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1441, 1450–
52, 1504–05, 1511–12 (2013) [hereinafter Inequitable Conduct in Retrospective]; New Equity, supra 
note 102, at 1001.  
141. See generally CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421 (2011); Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. 
Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 
(2002); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993). 
142. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012).   
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For multiple reasons, ERISA is a relevant and useful statute for determining 
equitable relief under the FMLA.  First, both are federal employee benefit 
statutes, found in the labor title of the U.S. Code, and contain an equitable relief 
provision for a violation of the respective statute.143  Specifically, ERISA’s 
remedial statute provides for “appropriate equitable relief . . . to 
redress . . . violations [of] . . . any provisions of [ERISA].”144  Second, circuit 
courts contemplating equitable estoppel’s application to the FMLA have looked 
to the doctrine’s involvement in ERISA cases for interpretative value.145  Third, 
legal scholars have argued that equity, including estoppel, is a “trans-
substantive” area of the law and should be understood across subjects as an 
“interlocking web of precepts.”146  More generally, ERISA precedent from the 
U.S. Supreme Court demonstrates its problematic approach to the doctrine, 
which supports this Comment’s broader proposition that FMLA equitable 
estoppel litigation must develop a more concrete path as a result.147   
Succinctly turning to the relevant ERISA cases, from 1993 to 2011, the 
Court very slowly interpreted the meaning “appropriate equitable relief” in 
ERISA’s § 1132(a)(3).148  This leisurely approach led circuit courts—
 
143. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(B) (2012) (“for such equitable relief as may be 
appropriate”), with 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012) (“appropriate equitable relief . . . to 
redress . . . violations [of] . . . any provisions of [ERISA].”). 
144. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (emphasis added).   
145. See, e.g., Dobrowski, 571 F.3d at 555–57. 
146. Announcing the “Clean Hands” Doctrine, supra note 14, at 1836, 1838–39; Age of Statutes, 
supra note 17, at 666–68; see also Inequitable Conduct in Retrospective, supra note 140, at 1450–52, 
1504–05, 1511–12; JUDGING EQUITY, supra note 16, at 29.  New Equity, supra note 102, at 1001.  
“[T]he Supreme Court identified equitable defenses under a wide range of federal legislation.  It found 
them available in statutes regulating taxes, monopolies, and securities to employment discrimination 
and employee benefits to intellectual property.”  Statutory Interpretation, supra note 17, at 11.  
Compare Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 (2002) (“[29 U.S.C.] § 2617 
provides no relief unless the employee has been prejudiced by the violation.”), with CIGNA Corp., 563 
U.S. at 444–45 (“We are asked about the standard of prejudice.  And we conclude that the standard of 
prejudice must be borrowed from equitable principles, as modified by the obligations and injuries 
identified by ERISA itself.”).  
147. Harthill, supra note 13, at 771, 788 (discussing potential issues with the Court’s decision in 
CIGNA Corp.).   
148. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).  The doctrine struggled to gain traction with circuits courts as the 
Supreme Court slowly inched its way along before affirmatively discussing it.  Jeffrey A. Herman, 
Equitable Estoppel in ERISA: Reviving a Dead Remedy, 31 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 129, 130–32 
(2015) [hereinafter Reviving a Dead Remedy]; see also Michael T. Graham, View from McDermott: 
Estoppel Claims Under ERISA—Confusion in Need of Clarification, BLOOMBERG L.: BENEFITS & 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION NEWS (July 29, 2013), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/employee-
benefits/view-from-mcdermott-estoppel-claims-under-erisaconfusion-in-need-of-clarification 
[https://perma.cc/4PQ4-35YL]. 
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throughout this time period—to interpret the statute differently, just as it is 
seemingly becoming the case with the FMLA.149  In particular, some circuits 
found that equitable estoppel did not apply under the statute150 while other 
circuits determined the exact opposite.151  During this period, it took at least five 
cases before the U.S. Supreme Court read equitable estoppel into “appropriate 
equitable relief” under ERISA.152  Initially in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,153 
the Court defined the § 1132(a)(3)’s “equitable relief” as “categories of relief 
that were typically available in equity,”154 “prior to the merger of law and equity 
[courts].”155  However, the Court did not enumerate what specific types of 
equitable relief fell within ERISA’s remedial statute, initiating uncertainty 
regarding the doctrine’s applicability.156  In the three subsequent cases, the 
Court reaffirmed Mertens’ interpretation of “appropriate equitable relief” and 
in each instance, it did not articulate any particular form of equitable relief that 
 
149. “[T]he [Supreme] Court has been slowly, perhaps even accidentally, laying the foundation 
for a very different future for the law of remedies.”  New Equity, supra note 102, at 999; see also 
discussion supra Sections II.B–C.  
150. See, e.g., McCravy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 650 F.3d 414, 421–22 (4th Cir. 2011), 
rev’d, 690 F.3d 176, 182 (4th Cir. 2012) (in light of CIGNA Corp., 563 U.S.421); Livick v. Gillette 
Co., 524 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir. 2008) (acknowledging its consistent refusal to recognize estoppel claims 
under ERISA); Miller v. Coastal Corp., 978 F.2d 622, 624–25 (10th Cir. 1992) (same). 
151. See e.g., Paul v. Detroit Edison Co. & Mich. Consol. Gas Co. Pension Plan, 642 F. App’x 
588, 593 (6th Cir. 2016); Renfro v. Funky Door Long Term Disability Plan, 686 F.3d 1044, 1054 (9th 
Cir. 2012); Pearson v. Voith Paper Rolls, Inc., 656 F.3d 504, 509 (7th Cir. 2011); Hooven v. Exxon 
Mobil Corp., 465 F.3d 566, 571 (3d Cir. 2006); Mello v. Sara Lee Corp., 431 F.3d 440, 444–45 (5th 
Cir. 2005); Weinreb v. Hospital for Joint Diseases Orthopaedic Inst., 404 F.3d 167, 172–73 (2nd Cir. 
2005); Jones v. Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1065, 1069–70 (11th Cir. 2004); Graham 
v. SEC, 222 F.3d 994, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Neely v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 123 F.3d 1127, 
1129–30 (8th Cir. 1997).  
152. See generally CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421 (2011); Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. 
Servs., 547 U.S. 356 (2006); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002); 
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993).  
153. 508 U.S. 248 (1993). 
154. Id. at 256 (emphasis omitted).  
155. CIGNA Corp., 563 U.S. at 439 (citing Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 361; Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256).   
156. “[W]hat petitioners in fact seek is nothing other than compensatory damages . . . .  Money 
damages are, of course, the classic form of legal relief.”  Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255 (emphasis omitted).  
After distinguishing legal and equitable relief, the Court went no further to define what types of 
damages were included in “appropriate equitable relief.”  Id. at 255–63.   
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was available.157  Finally, in CIGNA Corp. v. Amara,158 nearly twenty years 
after Mertens, the Court explicitly determined that equitable estoppel was an 
available remedy authorized by § 1132(a)(3).159  The Court reasoned that the 
lower court’s remedy—requiring a party to do what it had promised160—closely 
resembled what the Court found to be the definition of equitable estoppel, that 
is, “to place the person entitled to its benefit in the same position he would have 
been in had the representations been true.”161  
Notably, the Court declined to formulate a legal standard for what must be 
shown to invoke equitable estoppel.162  Instead, it left the “requirement of harm” 
for the lower court to find “for the law of equity.”163  However, the Court still 
required that the lower court verify detrimental reliance, at minimum, be 
 
157. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 361–62; Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 209–210; Varity Corp., 516 U.S. 
at 512–13, 515.  In fact, the Court only mentioned what was not considered appropriate “equitable 
relief” under § 1132(a)(3).  Varity Corp. 516. U.S. at 512–13, 515.  Interestingly, Varity Corp. came 
close to acknowledging equitable estoppel in its expansive reading of § 1132(a)(3).  Id.  The Court 
affirmed money damages (or legal relief as understood in Mertens) “to compensate them for benefits 
of which . . . they had been deprived” and thus to “restore[] [them] to the position they would have 
occupied if the misrepresentations . . . had never occurred.”  Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 756 
(8th Cir. 1994), aff’d, Varity Corp., 516 U.S. 489.  This more expansive reading of 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) is very similar to a general definition of equitable estoppel.  See supra notes 10, 
11, 48, 107 (defining equitable estoppel).  Nonetheless, Sereboff and Great-West retracted Varity 
Corp.’s expansive interpretation, which seemingly applied equitable estoppel to ERISA.  See EMILY 
C. LECHNER, “EQUITABLE” RELIEF UNDER ERISA: WHERE THE COURT’S INTERPRETATION STANDS 
AND THE NEED TO REDEFINE ITS ANALYSIS TO REFLECT THE TRUST-LAW BASIS OF ERISA 6 (2012) 
[hereinafter EQUITABLE RELIEF UNDER ERISA], https://www.acebc.com/public-docs/writing-comp-
papers/2012_Equitable_Relief_Under_ERISA.pdf [https://perma.cc/ET4U-ENV7] (“[L]anguage in 
[Great-West Life and Sereboff] suggests that these cases stand for the broader proposition that money 
damages are generally not available under [29 U.S.C. § 1132](a)(3).”). 
158. 563 U.S. 421 (2011). 
159. Id. at 443.  Interestingly, the Court implies that when determining the application of 
equitable estoppel and a particular legal standard, it will first look to the relevant statute for answers to 
both inquires.  Id.  “[A] court exercises its authority under § [1132](a)(3) to impose a remedy 
equivalent to estoppel.”  Id.  Here, it found the doctrine was authorized by § 1132(a)(3) but the 
“substantive provisions of ERISA” did not provide any legal standard, so the Court turned to “the law 
of equity” for the lower court to determine.  Id.  
160. “[T]he District Court’s remedy essentially held CIGNA to what it had promised, namely, 
that the new plan would not take from its employees benefits they had already accrued.”  Id. at 441.  
161. Id. (quoting EATON, supra note 11, at § 62).  Compare id. at 443 (defining equitable 
estoppel vaguely), with Varity Corp., 36 F.3d at 756 (“to compensate them for benefits of 
which . . . they had been deprived” and thus to “restore[] [them] to the position they would have 
occupied if the misrepresentations . . . had never occurred.”).   
162. CIGNA Corp., 563 U.S. at 443. 
163. Id.  
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present before invoking the doctrine.164  Thus, the Court’s reasoning left ample 
room for lower courts—at their discretion—to incorporate their own reasoning 
into equitable estoppel.  
Because of the similarities between the FMLA and ERISA equitable relief 
statutes, these ERISA cases demonstrate the Court’s likely similar inclusion of 
equitable estoppel in the FMLA.  However, this conclusion should not be 
reached without some reservation.  Some notable issues exist that may impede 
the presumptive correlation between the statutes and threaten the doctrine’s 
application to the FMLA.  These issues include (a) the fact that CIGNA Corp.’s 
acknowledgment of equitable estoppel was arguably dicta and (b) the 
fundamental differences that exist between the two statutes.  These particular 
issues are briefly analyzed below and although valid and reasonable, can likely 
be set aside to recognize the doctrine’s FMLA applicability.    
a. CIGNA Corp. Dicta 
In the aftermath of CIGNA Corp., some circuit courts still questioned 
whether equitable estoppel applied to ERISA, regardless of whether its 
application was authorized by § 1132(a)(3) or the law of equity.165  This 
argument originates from Justice Scalia’s CIGNA Corp. concurrence in which 
he argues that the Court’s recognition of estoppel as a “distinctively equitable 
remed[y]” under § 1132(a)(3) was “purely dicta,” and even if the Court 
followed its dicta, it was unclear whether estoppel was even available in the 
case at issue.166  If the doctrine does not apply to ERISA, intuitively, it follows 
that CIGNA Corp. may be insufficient to statutorily authorize equitable estoppel 
under the FMLA.   
 
164. Id.  The CIGNA Corp. Court states:  
Looking to the law of equity, there is no general principle that “detrimental 
reliance” must be proved before a remedy is decreed.  To the extent any such 
requirement arises, it is because the specific remedy being contemplated 
imposes such a requirement.  Thus, . . . when equity courts used the remedy of 
estoppel, they insisted upon a showing akin to detrimental reliance, i.e., that the 
defendant’s statement “in truth, influenced the conduct of” the plaintiff, causing 
“prejudic[e].”  Accordingly, when a court exercises its authority under 
§ [1132](a)(3) to impose a remedy equivalent to estoppel, a showing of 
detrimental reliance must be made.  
Id. at 443 (internal citations omitted).  
165. See EQUITABLE RELIEF UNDER ERISA, supra note 157, at 30 (emphasis omitted) (arguing 
that the Court’s “form of estoppel is a feature of contract law, not trust law, and therefore should not 
qualify as ‘appropriate equitable relief’ under [29 U.S.C.] § [1132](a)(3).”). 
166. CIGNA Corp., 563 U.S. at 448–51 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
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Justice Scalia’s concurrence in CIGNA Corp. is compelling due to the 
similar language in each equitable relief statute.167  Some courts “seiz[ed] on 
Justice Scalia’s conclusion” immediately after the Court decided CIGNA 
Corp.168  By and large, however, circuit courts—even those that refused to 
apply equitable estoppel before CIGNA Corp.—have since disposed of Justice 
Scalia’s concurrence and agreed that the doctrine applies to ERISA.169  Also, 
even if CIGNA Corp.’s reasoning was dicta, it is binding to circuits that 
recognize the Court’s dicta with precedential value.170   
b. Textual Differences 
In addition to Justice Scalia’s (likely insufficient) dicta argument, a key 
textual difference between ERISA and the FMLA may impact the direct 
correlation of equitable estoppel’s application to both laws.  This difference is 
evident in the FMLA’s enumerated equitable remedies in § 2617 compared to 
ERISA’s vague equitable relief statute.171  Although this difference 
demonstrates an important and valid argument, it alone, will likely not void a 
statutory “presumption” that the doctrine applies to the FMLA.172  Once again, 
however, it does more broadly illuminate a necessity for the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s input on this matter. 
As it relates to statutory construction, the plain language of the FMLA’s 
equitable relief statute is certainly distinguishable from its ERISA counterpart.  
Section 1132(a)(3) is inherently vague: “[T]o obtain other appropriate equitable 
relief (i) to redress . . . violations [of ERISA] or (ii) to enforce any provisions 
of [ERISA] or the terms of the plan.”173  By contrast, the FMLA provides “for 
 
167. Id. at 445 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
168. Harthill, supra note 13, at 776 n.65 (citing N. Cyprus Med. Ctr. Operating Co. v. CIGNA 
Healthcare, No. 4:09-cv-2556, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127526, at *25–26 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2011); 
Biglands v. Raytheon Emp. Sav. & Inv. Plan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 781, 786 (N.D. Ind. 2011)). 
169. See, e.g., Jensen v. Solvay Chems., Inc., 721 F.3d 1180, 1185 (10th Cir. 2013); McCravy 
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 690 F.3d 176, 182 (4th Cir. 2012).  
170. McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 910 
(1992) (“[F]ederal . . . courts are bound by the Supreme Court’s considered dicta almost as firmly as 
by the Court’s outright holdings.”)  (internal citation omitted).  See also Reviving a Dead Remedy, 
supra note 148, at 132 n.21 (discussing the Eighth Circuit’s precedential value of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s dicta).   
171. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(B) (2012) (“for such equitable relief as may be 
appropriate”), with 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012) (“appropriate equitable relief . . . to 
redress . . . violations [of] . . . any provisions of [ERISA].”). 
172. Statutory Interpretation, supra note 17, at 9 (“[T]he [U.S.] Supreme Court [has] employ[ed] 
an equity-protective presumption in interpreting federal statutes.”); see also id. at 14, 18, 33–35, 41, 
44–47, 50, 52–53. 
173. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012).  
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such equitable relief as may be appropriate, including employment, 
reinstatement, and promotion.”174  An originalist would likely view the express 
enumeration of these equitable remedies as the only types authorized by 
Congress.175  However, this argument is likely invalidated by recent U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent reading equitable defenses, such as estoppel, into 
equitable relief statutes that are otherwise silent on such relief.176  Therefore, 
even if a statute does not explicitly state certain types of equitable doctrines, 
the Court typically reads them into a respective statute so long as the invocation 
is consistent with the purposes of equity and the statute.177   
In FMLA cases, such as when an employer misrepresents an employee’s 
FMLA eligibility, it is clearly the employer’s fault if the employee relies on that 
misrepresentation, regardless of whether the employee was eligible.  As 
mentioned in Section II.A, the goal of equity is focused on anti-opportunism, 
or to avoid “a wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of his [or her] 
transgression.”178  Because the law arguably fails for its generality, an employer 
would enjoy the “fruits of [its] transgression” if a court were to find that 
equitable estoppel does not apply to the FMLA because of the express 
enumeration of relief in 29 U.S.C. § 2617.  It has historically been the Supreme 
Court’s view to ensure equity is available in such circumstances.179  
Accordingly, the textual difference between the ERSIA and FMLA equitable 
relief statutes should bear no issue on the inclusion of estoppel in the FMLA. 
In conclusion, the conjunction of the reasoning set forth in Ragsdale and 
circuit courts invocation of the equitable estoppel in ERISA cases, despite the 
counterarguments from CIGNA Corp., likely supports the notion that equitable 
estoppel applies to FMLA claims. 
 
174. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(B), with 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (emphasis added). 
175. New Equity, supra note 102, at 1011.  
176. Id. at 1012–18; Statutory Interpretation, supra note 17, at 35–36, 41–42 (identifying and 
justifying presumption of equitable doctrines in federal statutes on democratic and rule of law 
grounds); see also Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 684–85 (2014) (finding 
equitable estoppel available under the Copyright Act, which was otherwise silent on equitable 
defenses); Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532, 538–39 (1937) (stating that because the statute at issue did 
not preclude equitable defenses, estoppel was available under a federal tax statute).   
177. Age of Statutes, supra note 17, at 683.  Equitable doctrines are “sticky and spongy.”  Id.  
They tend to be included in an otherwise silent statute to promote fair play, prevent unfair opportunism 
etc. but also absorb the values of the legislation.  Id. at 679, 683.  
178. JUDGING EQUITY, supra note 16, at 21 (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. 
Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945)).   
179. See id.; Statutory Interpretation, supra note 17, at 18–19.  
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B. Is Intent Required or Just Knowledge? 
Assuming that equitable estoppel applies to the FMLA, an imperative 
question still remains: must the party to be estopped (the employer) have 
intended the misrepresentation?  Proving an employer’s intent to mislead is a 
heavy burden compared to showing a mere misrepresentation of fact or simple 
mistake.180  However, either standard of intent may unfairly tip the balance in 
favor of one party.181  In one instance, requiring an intent to mislead reduces 
the likelihood equitable estoppel is invoked because it necessitates an analysis 
of the employer’s subjective state of mind, which favors the employer.182  On 
the contrary, when removing intent from the analysis increases the likelihood 
of invoking the doctrine because no subjective analysis in required, which 
favors employees.183  Unfortunately, these standards—like estoppel 
generally—are completely jurisdictional.184  Furthermore, the law of equity is 
constantly evolving.185  As such, determining the standard of intent in the 
FMLA context is a challenging task.  
Despite the above illustration framing intent as an all-or-nothing concept,186 
a middle ground approach between the standards may be possible.  As discussed 
in Section II.C.3., the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Plumley v. 
Southern Container, Inc. considered the standard of intent for FMLA equitable 
 
180. EATON, supra note 11, at § 60 (“It would limit the rule much within the reason of it if it 
were restricted to cases where there was an element of fraudulent purpose.”); POMEROY, supra note 
11, at § 805. 
181. See Age of Statutes, supra note 17, at 681. 
182. This has been the typical trend for circuit courts in ERISA cases.  See JAYNE E. ZANGLEIN, 
SEAN M. ANDERSON, BRENDAN S. MAHER, PETER K. STRIS, & LAWRENCE A. FROLIK, ERISA 
LITIGATION 40-4–12 (6th ed. 2017) (citing circuit court cases in which “extraordinary circumstances” 
or “fraudulent misrepresentations” are required).   
183. This is the Heckler standard, which has been commonly followed by circuit courts in FMLA 
cases.  Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 59 (1984); see also discussion supra Section 
II.C.3.  Moreover, whether intent is required may breed forum shopping, as Attorney Michael Graham 
argues in the ERISA estoppel context, which can negatively impact either side.  Graham, supra note 
148.  This same principle can be reasonably applied to FMLA litigation. 
184. The Triumph of Equity, supra note 10, at 409–10.  The number and type of requirements 
for a showing of equitable estoppel vary among the circuits.  See discussion supra Section II.C.3 
(demonstrating multiple formulations of the doctrine); discussion infra Section III.B.1. (illustrating 
disparity among the circuits regarding intent in ERISA cases).  
185. The Triumph of Equity, supra note 10, at 410–11. 
186. Requiring intent can be seen as the “ceiling” because it is the most difficult to show while 
no requirement of intent can be labeled as the “floor” as a mere mistake could render an employer 
liable.  
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estoppel in a slightly different light.187  Rather than analyzing an employer’s 
intention at the time of the misrepresentation, Plumley instead required an 
employer to have knowledge of the true facts.188  Plumley’s intent standard 
suggests a moderate approach between the express intent to mislead, as many 
circuit courts have done with ERISA,189 and the Supreme Court’s intent-absent 
Heckler decision that adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts definition, of 
which some circuit courts have followed in the FMLA context.190  
As Dr. Anenson notes, equitable estoppel (and for that matter, equity 
generally) is rarely analyzed sufficiently.191  This deficiency breeds 
considerable legal uncertainty and provides opportunities for practitioners to 
dispute the element of intent.192  In order to eliminate this uncertainty related to 
the appropriate standard of intent for FMLA equitable estoppel, this Section 
analyzes three areas of the law.  First, this Section examines the standards of 
intent in ERISA equitable estoppel cases.  Second, it discusses the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s traditional view of equity as a useful tool for discerning a 
standard of intent if the Court were to review a case regarding the doctrine in 
 
187. See Plumley v. S. Container, Inc., 303 F.3d 364, 373–75 (1st Cir. 2002); discussion supra 
Section II.C.3. 
188. Id. at 374. 
189. Some lower courts have still opted for the Heckler standard.  Neely v. Am. Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 123 F.3d 1127, 1129–30 (8th Cir. 1997); Flynn v. Interior Finishes, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 38, 
47 (D.D.C. 2006); Jensen v. SIPCO, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 1384, 1392 (N.D. Iowa 1993), aff’d, 38 F.3d 
945 (8th Cir. 1994). 
190. Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 59 (1984) (requiring a “definite 
misrepresentation” without defining what that truly means).  Eaton and Pomeroy agree that an essential 
element of the doctrine is that the party to be estopped “must have knowledge . . . at the time the 
representations were made, that they were untrue.”  EATON, supra note 11, at § 61; see also POMEROY, 
supra note 11, at § 805 (“The[] facts must be known to the party estopped at the time of his said 
conduct . . . .”).  But see discussion supra Section II.C.3 (stating some circuits courts have incorporated 
intent into their FMLA estoppel analysis). 
191. From Theory to Practice, supra note 21, at 644. 
192. Id.  A misunderstanding of the doctrine may be due to “human nature and heavy dockets 
[that] press present purveyors of the past protective doctrines of equity to look for easy answers to 
difficult questions . . . . ”  Id.   
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the FMLA.193  Third, the moderate standard adopted by Plumley is further 
analyzed.194   
1. Is ERISA Litigation Helpful? 
Although ERISA was, to some extent, useful for determining equitable 
estoppel’s application to the FMLA, its momentum likely ends when discerning 
the appropriate standard of intent.  This is largely due to the vague reasoning 
left behind by CIGNA Corp.195  As a result, ERISA equitable estoppel litigation 
among the circuit courts has incorporated two standards of intent for the 
doctrine.196  Specifically, some circuit courts have adopted Heckler’s 
standard197 and excluded the intent requirement for ERISA.198  But by contrast, 
circuit courts have also analyzed the doctrine in ERISA and incorporated an 
intent to mislead as an element, labeling it “extraordinary circumstances.”199  
Although the intent element is unsettled law among the circuits in ERISA 
cases, thus providing little precedential value for FMLA equitable estoppel, it 
still should not completely bar ERISA’s relevance for an appropriate standard.  
 
193. Dr. Anenson develops a “[m]ethod [o]f [e]quity” to understand equitable doctrines such as 
estoppel.  Age of Statutes, supra note 17, at 665–68.  This method includes applying “the importance 
of tradition, the influence of public policy, and the relevance of discretion.”  Id. at 668.  I apply her 
methodology but also include U.S. Supreme Court precedent from ERSIA cases.  Dr. Anenson has 
previously incorporated precedent into her equity analysis before opting for her recent formulation of 
tradition, public policy, and discretion.  See From Theory to Practice, supra note 21, at 635 (following 
a model formulated in The Five Types of Legal Argument); see generally WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE 
TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT (2002).   
194. See Plumley v. S. Container, Inc., 303 F.3d 364, 374 (1st Cir. 2002). 
195. CIGNA Corp. declined to formulate any particular legal standard for invoking equitable 
estoppel, short of requiring detrimental reliance.  CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 443 (2011).   
196. See infra notes 202–13.  
197. Heckler did not require intent be present in its definition of equitable estoppel.  See Heckler 
v. Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 59 (1984).  
198. See, e.g., Neely v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 123 F.3d 1127, 1129–30 (8th Cir. 1997); 
Flynn v. Interior Finishes, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 38, 47 (D.D.C. 2006); Jensen v. SIPCO, Inc., 867 F. 
Supp. 1384, 1392 (N.D. Iowa 1993), aff’d, 38 F.3d 945 (8th Cir. 1994).  
199. Intent to mislead is required to invoke equitable estoppel in ERISA cases in the Court of 
Appeals for the Second, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits.  See, e.g., O’Blenis v. Nat’l Elevator Indus. 
Pension Plan, 645 F. App’x 179, 181 (3d Cir. 2016) (unpublished); Cataldo v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 
F.3d 542, 553 (6th Cir. 2012); Schorsch v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 
2012); Pearson v. Voith Paper Rolls, Inc., 656 F.3d 504, 509 (7th Cir. 2011); Pell v. E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co. Inc., 539 F.3d 292, 300 (3d Cir. 2008); Weinreb v. Hosp. for Joint Diseases 
Orthopaedic Inst., 404 F.3d 167, 172–73 (2d Cir. 2005); Greifenberger v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 131 
F. App’x 756, 759 (2d Cir. 2005).  The Fifth Circuit likely requires intent to mislead as well.  See Mello 
v. Sara Lee Corp., 431 F.3d 440, 444–48 (5th Cir. 2005) (including “extraordinary circumstances” as 
an element but declining to analyze its meaning because detrimental reliance did not exist). 
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This is because equitable doctrines are trans-substantive and can be 
concurrently applied throughout the U.S. Code.200  Courts contemplating intent 
in the FMLA context would certainly discover substantial legal analysis in 
ERISA cases—from some circuits201—arguing for the inclusion of express 
intent in the FMLA.202  And, if anything, ERISA case law still remains relevant 
because it illustrates why the U.S. Supreme Court must develop a legal standard 
in the FMLA in order to avoid similar ambiguous results in litigation of the Act. 
If a court chooses to analyze ERISA equitable estoppel cases in search of 
the proper intent standard for the FMLA, it should note the two interpretative 
sources that the Court cited in CIGNA Corp. for finding that the doctrine was 
statutorily authorized by ERISA.  In particular, Pomeroy and Eaton’s works on 
equitable estoppel apply a different meaning to an employer’s state of mind.203  
Although Pomeroy and Eaton require an employer’s conduct to be “voluntary” 
and “willful[],” suggesting that intent to mislead is implied, these terms actually 
mean something very different.204  In fact, the terms mean that the employer 
making the statements must do so under its own volition with the intent that the 
employee act on its statements.205  When contemplating the employer’s state of 
mind, Pomeroy and Eaton instead require knowledge of the true facts.206  This 
standard of intent falls below what multiple circuit courts in ERISA have 
required but remains slightly above Heckler’s “definite misrepresentation[s]” 
standard adopted by some circuit courts in both the FMLA and ERISA 
 
200. Age of Statutes, supra note 17, at 666. 
201. See cases cited supra note 141.  
202. This is especially true for those circuits who have included intent into FMLA equitable 
estoppel but only in unpublished opinions or when the government is the employer.  See, e.g., Cowman 
v. Northland Hearing Ctrs., Inc., 628 F. App’x 669, 672 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished); 
Dawkins v. Fulton Cty. Gov’t, 733 F.3d 1084, 1089 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). 
203. EATON’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at § 59 n.1; POMEROY, supra note 11, at § 805.  
CIGNA Corp. also cites two other treatises in its opinion when generally discussing equitable estoppel; 
however, when it actually analyzes the doctrine, it only cites to Pomeroy and Eaton.  See CIGNA Corp. 
v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 441, 443 (2011) (citing ELIAS MERWIN, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND EQUITY 
PLEADING § 910 (H. C. Merwin ed. 1895); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE § 692 (Jairus W. Perry ed., 12th ed. 1877)); see also Reviving a Dead Remedy, supra 
note 148, at 134–36 (incorporating each treatise cited in CIGNA Corp. when analyzing the intent 
element for ERISA equitable estoppel).  
204. EATON’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at § 59 n.1, § 61; see also POMEROY, supra note 11, 
at § 805. 
205. EATON’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at § 59 n.1, § 61. 
206. Id. § 61; POMEROY, supra note 11, at § 805.  In fact, Pomeroy and Eaton both affirmatively 
denounce an intent to mislead.  See EATON, supra note 11, at §§ 60–61; POMEROY, supra note 11, 
at § 805. 
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context.207  And actually, their definition aligns more closely with Plumley.208  
However, it should be noted that the Court’s estoppel analysis in CIGNA Corp. 
on Pomeroy and Eaton’s literature was rather limited.209  Its reference to their 
works is still important because it at least provides some guidance on where the 
Court may turn when interpreting the FMLA’s equitable relief statute.210  
Lastly, a court must also be cautious about the validity of a heightened 
intent standard adopted by some circuit courts in the ERISA context based on 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of “extraordinary 
circumstances.”211  This term, which many circuit courts have used 
synonymously with intent or bad faith, was recently struck down by the Court 
in a separate ERISA provision.212  Attorney Herman contends that the Court 
would follow the same trend when interpreting the term under § 1132(a)(3).213   
In summation, ERISA litigation provides some support for discerning what 
standard of intent should be applied to the FMLA; however, such support is 
likely insufficient.  If a court still chooses to utilize ERISA equitable estoppel 
litigation, it must consider the shortcomings in the aftermath of CIGNA Corp.  
Even so, ERISA litigation amongst the circuits has demonstrated that the 
 
207. Compare Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 59 (1984) (“[i]f one person makes 
a definite misrepresentation of fact to another person having reason to believe that the other will rely 
upon it and the other in reasonable reliance upon it does an act”), with EATON, supra note 11, at § 61 
(“The party against whom the estoppel is alleged must have knowledge . . . at the time the 
representations were made, that they were untrue.”).   
208. Compare EATON, supra note 11, at § 61 (“The party against whom the estoppel is alleged 
must have knowledge . . . at the time the representations were made, that they were untrue.”), and 
POMEROY, supra note 11, at § 805 (requiring “[t]he[] facts must be known to the party estopped at the 
time of his said conduct”), with Plumley v. S. Container, Inc., 303 F.3d 364, 374 (1st Cir. 2002) (“the 
party to be estopped must know the facts . . . the [party asserting estoppel] must be ignorant of the true 
facts . . . .”).  
209. See CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 443 (2011).  
210. The U.S. Supreme Court has developed a preference for consulting treatises when 
determining equitable remedies and related doctrines.  See, e.g., Age of Statutes, supra note 17, at 684; 
New Equity, supra note 102, at 1014–15. 
211. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 418 (2014).  “Section 
1104(a)(2) . . . does not require plaintiffs to allege that the employer was on the ‘brink of collapse,’ 
under ‘extraordinary circumstances,’ or the like.”  Id. at 419.  It was considered “defense-friendly,” id. 
at 412, 424, and “imposed a significant burden on ERISA plaintiffs,” Reviving a Dead Remedy, supra 
note 148, at 147.   
212. Id.  “[L]imitations in [equitable estoppel] itself, such as the reasonable reliance requirement, 
are sufficient to address oral statements that directly contradict unambiguous plan language or to weed 
out frivolous claims.”  Id.   
213. “[T]he Court is unlikely to allow lower courts to impose the extraordinary circumstances 
requirement for ERISA estoppel claims, since section 1132(a) contains no such language.”  Id. at 147–
48.   
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question of intent portrays equitable estoppel in its usual form; that is, the 
doctrine is a “chao[tic]” one.214  The disparity over the doctrine’s intent 
requirement evidences the overwhelming importance for the Court to formulate 
a consistent rule, either separately between ERISA215 and the FMLA or perhaps 
even together, as one.216  At minimum, the opportunity missed in CIGNA Corp. 
to clarify the doctrine should not be ignored again if or when a similar case 
arises in the FMLA context. 
2. Does the U.S Supreme Court’s Broader Analysis of Equitable Doctrines 
Require Intent? 
The U.S. Supreme Court and the circuit courts have generally interpreted 
and applied equitable principles differently.217  This Section focuses on the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  In a recent survey of Supreme Court decisions involving 
equitable doctrines in federal statutes over the last two centuries, Dr. Anenson 
identified an approach to the Court’s equity jurisprudence.218  She characterized 
the Court’s analysis of equitable relief statutes as a three-step process that looks 
to tradition, public policy, and discretion.219  Applying her framework to the 
FMLA’s equitable relief statute may help determine the most appropriate 
standard of intent under the Act.220 
First, beginning with tradition, equity cases before the Court interpreting 
other federal statutes have demonstrated that the Court “consistently define[s] 
equitable defenses according to their historical descriptions and rationales as 
 
214. “[E]quitable estoppel has attained universal recognition but has not acquired a universal 
definition.  There are conflicting cases on nearly every point of inquiry.”  The Triumph of Equity, supra 
note 10, at 410.   
215. Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionality and the Grand Irony of ERISA, 61 
HASTINGS L.J. 131, 135 (2009) (“Congress should also take steps to expand the remedies available 
under ERISA.”); Announcing the “Clean Hands” Doctrine, supra note 14, at 1888 (“Applying the 
narrowest defense would also enhance clarity and coherence in an otherwise amorphous area of the 
law.”); Statutory Interpretation, supra note 17, at 5 (“The meaning of equity needs clarification in 
federal law.”).  
216. See The Triumph of Equity, supra note 10, at 410–11.  “[O]ne would expect the recurring 
references to ‘equitable relief’ in the U.S. Code to have something in common.”  New Equity, supra 
note 102, at 1019.  
217. Because the Court has looked at equity generally this way, the same methodology can apply 
more specifically to equitable estoppel.  
218. Age of Statutes, supra note 17, at 673.  
219. Id. at 668.  
220. See Dana Muir, From Schism to Prism: Equitable Relief in Employee Benefit Plans, 55 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 599, 644–48 (2018) (using Dr. Anenson’s approach in part to understand equitable relief 
under ERISA). 
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well as confine[s] them to their customary contexts.”221  The Court’s practice 
of this interpretative method maintains “the integrity of the law”—a core 
principle of equity generally.222  Applying this principle to the FMLA to 
determine whether intent is included in equitable estoppel yields a helpful 
answer.   
The traditional view of intent for equitable estoppel began with an intent to 
deceive but shifted to a “willful conduct” approach.223  However, the FMLA 
was enacted in 1993224—long after the 1950s through the 1970s, in which the 
most recent treatises providing a comprehensive analysis of equity were 
published.225  Because the FMLA is relatively new, a historical perspective of 
equity in litigation of the Act is helpful, but not determinative.226  Additionally, 
the Court in some instances has deviated from traditional definitions of 
equitable defenses, such as estoppel, because sufficient accurate information is 
nonexistent.227  Professor Bray argues that this recent trend of acknowledging 
this insufficiency provides the Court with an avenue to “smooth[] over the 
rough edges of [equity’s] history.”228  Therefore, the history of equity likely 
does not provide sufficient analysis for discovering the applicable standard of 
intent that should be incorporated into the FMLA.   
Despite the limited support under the tradition prong, Dr. Anenson’s second 
principle—public policy—likely provides adequate support for the appropriate 
standard.  The Court has demonstrated a willingness to “tie[] equity’s public 
interest doctrine to legislative objectives.”229  In doing so, the Court would 
“modernize” equitable estoppel by expanding or contracting it based on public 
 
221. Age of Statutes, supra note 17, at 668.  
222. Id. at 671. 
223. Compare Cataldo v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 F.3d 542, 553 (6th Cir. 2012) (requiring fraud or 
intent to deceive), with Plumley v. S. Container, Inc., 303 F.3d 364, 374 (1st Cir. 2002) (requiring that 
the party relies on the “true facts”). 
224. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2018)). 
225. The Triumph of Equity, supra note 10, at 439; see also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Foreword to 
SELECTED ESSAYS ON EQUITY iii (Edward D. Re ed., 1955) (“The absence of a collection of leading 
articles on Equity has long been a serious lack among law books.”). 
226. [T]here may be occasions when the Supreme Court is unable to turn back the clock.”  Age 
of Statutes, supra note 17, at 694.  This is especially important because “[s]cholars have already 
accused the Supreme Court of indulging in several historical inaccuracies associated with equitable 
principles in its decisions.”  Id. at 695.  
227. Id. at 685; New Equity, supra note 102, at 1022–23.  
228. Age of Statutes, supra note 17, at 685.  
229. Id. at 673. 
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interest.  Specifically, the Court would turn to the FMLA’s statutory objectives 
or the purposes of equity.230   
Congress explicitly states five purposes for drafting the FMLA.231  This 
section can be broadly summarized as providing employment protection to 
employees who have familial or medical needs while also not over-providing 
statutory protection thus frustrating the legitimate interests of employers.  It is 
clear from the FMLA’s goals that Congress intended that a balancing between 
the interests of the employee and employer.  This balancing suggests that the 
standard of intent for equitable estoppel would also reflect this goal.  The goals 
of the FMLA would accordingly fit well with the standard in Plumley v. 
Southern Container, Inc.232  Recall the standard articulated in that case, 
specifically, the first element: “the party to be estopped must know the facts.”233 
The Plumley court provides a clear alternative to the standard of intent234 
but still maintains the Court’s public policy objective of expanding or 
contracting equity based on the parties’ interests.235  Instead of intending to 
mislead, Plumley lowers the bar ever so slightly.   By requiring knowledge of 
the true facts, Plumley’s reasoning focused less on the employer’s intent to 
mislead and more on its awareness of the information it was providing to an 
employee.236  This is a nuanced distinction with a more moderate approach 
compared to circuit courts’ “extraordinary circumstances” ERISA standard and 
Heckler’s intent-absent standard.237   
As a result, the Plumley court eliminates the inequity of an employer’s 
liability under equitable estoppel when it merely makes a mistake but still 
ensures liability when the facts are known.  Plumley’s rule is a fitting one 
because it encourages an employer to make accurate FMLA representations to 
an employee but still presents a reasonable path to harmonize this complex 
doctrine with predictability and stability.  
 
230. Id.  
231. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2018). 
232. 303 F.3d 364 (1st Cir. 2002). 
233. Id. at 374 (emphasis added).  
234. Id. 
235. Announcing the “Clean Hands” Doctrine, supra note 14, at 1884.  
236. Plumley, 303 F.3d at 374.  
237. Moreover, Plumley’s standard is consistent with Pomeroy and Eaton’s analysis of the intent 
requirement.  Compare id. (“the party to be estopped must know the facts . . . [and] the [party asserting 
estoppel] must be ignorant of the true facts . . . .”), with EATON, supra note 11, at § 61 (“The party 
against whom the estoppel is alleged must have knowledge . . . at the time the representations were 
made, that they were untrue.”), and POMEROY, supra note 11, at § 805 (“The[] facts must be known to 
the party estopped at the time of his said conduct . . . .”). 
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Lastly, Dr. Anenson’s third principle of discretion provides an important 
“safety value” for the Court when stating a consistent standard, whether it be 
Plumley’s moderate approach, ERISA’s express intent/extraordinary 
circumstances standard, or Heckler’s intent-absent approach.238  This 
discretionary “safety value,” also known as “residual discretion,” is a core 
characteristic of a court’s inherent equitable authority.239  Specifically, a trial 
court has the discretion to decline invocation of the doctrine, even when all 
elements are present.240  The decision of whether to incorporate intent into 
FMLA equitable estoppel is certainly a legal conundrum as support exists on 
either side of the analysis; however, the existence of this “safety value” should 
reduce any enhanced fear.  By the Court qualifying a clearly stated standard 
with a lower court’s discretion to not apply the doctrine, even when all elements 
are present, ensures a fair balancing of the party’s interests.241   
In the end, although the tradition of equity likely does not provide sufficient 
support for the standard of intent in equitable estoppel, public policy supported 
by a trial court’s residual discretionary authority suggests that the Court would 
find Plumley’s test very appropriate in the FMLA.  
C. Detrimental Reliance 
An analysis of equitable estoppel is not complete without a discussion of 
detrimental reliance.242  Fortunately, the element among the circuit courts in the 
FMLA context has not experienced much controversy as courts who have 
acknowledged the doctrine, have all required that detrimental reliance be 
present.243  This view has held up in the ERISA context as well because CIGNA 
Corp. affirmatively required it.244   
Nonetheless, circuit courts analyzing equitable estoppel in the FMLA 
context, especially those in a case of first impression, should note that the 
majority of state and federal courts still mandate reliance as a key ingredient of 
estoppel.245  And recent research supports the idea that the Supreme Court looks 
 
238. Age of Statutes, supra note 17, at 678–79. 
239. Id. at 679–80.  
240. Id. at 679–83.  See also New Equity, supra note 102, at 1042.  
241. Age of Statutes, supra note 17, at 679, 682. 
242. Recall that before equitable estoppel can be invoked, an employee must rely on the 
employer’s misrepresentation and suffer some detriment as a result.  See discussion supra Part I.  
243. See e.g., Dobrowski v. Jay Dee Contractors, Inc., 571 F.3d 551, 557 (6th Cir. 2009); 
Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 90–91 (2002). 
244. CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 443 (2011).   
245. The Triumph of Equity, supra note 10, at 389 (“[A] common ingredient of equitable 
estoppel: prejudicial reliance.”). 
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to both state and federal law in determining the definition of equitable doctrines 
under federal statutes.246  
In FMLA litigation, detrimental reliance is very important to an equitable 
estoppel analysis.247  Traditional authorities, Pomeroy and Eaton, agree that 
detrimental reliance must be present.248  The element ensures fairness to the 
employer by mandating that the employee actually suffer some harm.249  
Further, requiring this element also eliminates an employee from bringing their 
“unclean hands” to a lawsuit.250  For example, if an employee is aware that the 
employer is likely to misrepresent the employee’s FMLA eligibility, that 
employee may arbitrarily request FMLA leave and subsequently invoke 
equitable estoppel in a lawsuit after the employer disputes the employee’s 
eligibility.  Detrimental reliance bars such an abrasive tactic, which supports 
the underlying philosophy of policy in equity, and more specifically, equitable 
estoppel.   
Therefore, it is very likely that detrimental reliance as an element of 
equitable estoppel in the FMLA is here to stay (as it should be).  An analysis 
finding differently would be contrary to recent precedent and also have a 
negative impact on the “integrity of the justice system.”251  A court analyzing 
the doctrine in the FMLA context under a first impression would be well-
advised to require detrimental reliance.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel, and equity generally, is complex.  
Coupling the doctrine’s complexities with complicated federal statutes only 
 
246. Age of Statutes, supra note 17, at 685.  An important finding in Dr. Anenson’s paper is the 
Supreme Court’s analysis of equitable doctrine in a variety of state and federal law.  See generally id.  
Her work is consistent with Professor Caleb Nelson’s looking at common law (rather than equitable 
doctrines) in federal statutes.  Id.; Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
503, 505–25 (2006). 
247. “The requirement of reliance . . . is probably the biggest hurdle to overcome in invoking 
equitable estoppel.”  The Triumph of Equity, supra note 10, at 389; see also Nelson, Penick & Taylor, 
supra note 5, at 11-132–33 n.596 (citing several cases in which detrimental reliance was the dispositive 
element to the invocation of equitable estoppel).   
248. EATON, supra note 11, at § 61; POMEROY, supra note 11, at §§ 804–05. 
249. See From Theory to Practice, supra note 21, at 665; The Triumph of Equity, supra note 10, 
at 389–92. 
250. “The application of unclean hands protects judicial integrity ‘because allowing a plaintiff 
with unclean hands to recover in an action creates doubts as to the justice provided by the judicial 
system.’”  Announcing the “Clean Hands” Doctrine, supra note 14, at 1843 (quoting Kendall-Jackson 
Winery Ltd. v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 743, 749 (Ct. App. 1999)). 
251. Id. at 1841.   
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drives the analysis into greater uncertainty.252  ERISA litigation in circuit courts 
has clearly illustrated the impact of inconsistent rulings on the doctrine’s 
application and definition.  The FMLA has potential to follow a similarly vague 
path.  This Comment aims to end the uncertainty by aiding federal courts, and 
ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court, to determine estoppel’s availability and 
definition under the statute.  
MICHAEL VAN KLEUNEN* 
 
252. Joan M. Shepard, Comment, The Family Medical Leave Act: Calculating the “Hours of 
Service” for the Reinstated Employee, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 173, 173 n.1 (2008) (discussing the confusion 
that the FMLA creates for employers); Robert J. Aalberts & Lorne H. Seidman, The Family and 
Medical Leave Act: Does it Make Unreasonable Demands on Employers?, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 135, 
138–39, 142–43, 148 (1996) (stating that the FMLA is complex); see also Carlton R. Sickles, 
Introduction: The Significance and Complexity of ERISA, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 205, 213 (1975) 
(“ERISA is a long and complex Act.”).   
* Associate, Cramer, Multhauf & Hammes, LLP.  J.D., 2019, Marquette University Law School, 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin.  I owe a special thanks to Dr. T. Leigh Anenson with the University of 
Maryland Robert H. School of Business for immensely enhancing my understanding of equity.  I am 
also extremely grateful for the constant support from my family during this writing process.  Without 
them, I would not have been able to accomplish my personal goal of becoming a published author.  
The views, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed herein are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the views of Cramer, Multhauf & Hammes, LLP. 
